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A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO SEAT BELT ISSUES
STEPHEN J. WERBER
I. INTRODUCTION
A SCANNER-EQUIPPED HOVER CRAFT dispatched from a Kilkonian1
space exploration vessel made the following observations as it
surveyed events on the planet Earth:
Scanner Operator: Small object, weight approximately
three to six units,' appears to be a con-
tainer system bearing a life form.
System is moving at a velocity of .03
Klinktares 3
Captain: What is the method of container con-
trol?
Operator: Purely manual. Control is exercised as
a function of what the life form
observes through optical and auditory
senses.
A few moments later, a further observation takes place:
Operator: A second container system is in view
which appears to be similarly controlled
but which weighs in the range of four to
seven units and has a velocity of .04
Klinktares.
Captain: What are the courses of the systems?
Operator: Intersect is imminent.
Captain: Switch to visual observation screen.
Watching the ensuing intersect, the Captain notes moderate deforma-
tion of both container systems. As the deformation proceeds, the life
forms apparently attempt to fuse their bodies to the container systems.
Although the fusing effort fails, the life forms in both systems show no
*Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law. B.A., Adelphi Univ.; J.D., Cornell Univ.; LL.M., New York University.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Joan C. Werber and
Joseph D. Zamore for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
' Kilkonia is a fictional planet beyond the earth's galaxy with an advanced
technology.
' One Kilkonian unit is approximately equivalent to 1,000 pounds.
' A Klinktare is a time unit measure of velocity approximately equalivalent
to 1,000 miles per hour. The speed of the container system under observation in
earth terms was approximately thirty miles per hour.
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vital signs one sintar4 after the intersect. All observations are noted in
the Captain's Log and the scan is terminated.
What conclusion might our fictitious Kilkonian visitors draw from
their observations? The basic laws of physics indicate that a moving ob-
ject will continue moving in a straight line at a constant speed until
some force either modifies the object's direction or causes it to stop.'
The occupant of an automobile, although not moving in relation to the
vehicle, is moving relative to the ground at a speed equal to that of the
vehicle. An inherent awareness of these basic laws of motion would
presumably cause one to act so as to preclude or limit the potential of
striking the vehicle's interior in the event the automobile decelerates
rapidly. An objective observer could conclude that the failure to use a
restraint system was intentional and, therefore, the continued forward
motion of the vehicle occupant was desired. The ramifications of such a
conclusion are mindboggling.
Even before the government mandated,' manufacturers researched
and developed technology to aid in preventing or significantly reducing
automobile-related injuries and deaths. One result was the seat belt re-
straint system. For over a decade, the benefits of this research and
development have been available.
Seat belt restraint systems presently fall into two categories: 1) ac-
tive, where the vehicle occupant must take some affirmative steps to ac-
tivate the system, ie., physically buckle the belt; and 2) passive, where
the system is designed to provide automatic application.7 Either seat
A sintar is a time measure approximately equivalent to one second.
Newton's First Law of Motion states that a body at rest remains at rest,
and a body in motion continues to move at constant speed in a straight line unless
the body is acted upon by an unbalanced force. 1 R. RESNICK and D. HALLIDAY,
PHYSICS 82 (1966) [hereinafter cited as R. Resnick and D. Halliday].
Newton's Second Law of Motion states that an unbalanced force acting on a
body causes the body to accelerate in the direction of the force, proportional to
the unbalanced force and inversely proportional to the mass of the body. Id. at 85.
The relationship of the basic laws of physics to automobile accidents and safety
belts is set forth in NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD. (NHTSA), U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., PHYSICS AND AUTOMOBILE SAFETY BELTS (1977).
6 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1979).
One such system, introduced on the Volkswagen Rabbit consists of a shoulder
harness, affixed to the car door, which automatically moves into place when the oc-
cupant sits down and closes the door. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD.
(NHTSA), U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OCCUPANT PROTECTION PROGRAM PROGRESS
REPORT No. 2 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PROGRESS REPORT].
Another form of passive restraint system is the air bag. However, its effec-
tiveness and technical integrity have been questioned. See generally U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., IMPACT TESTS OF A NEAR-PRODUCTION AIR CUSHION RESTRAINT, FINAL
REPORT (Synopsis) (1974); PROGRESS REPORT, supra this note, at 37; Gaskill, The
Inflatable Occupant Restraint System in the Small Car, INT'L CONF. ON PASSIVE
RESTRAINTS, MILFORD, MICH. 57 (1970); MacKay, Airbag Effectiveness-A Case




belt restraint system is inexpensive and easy to use. Barring impacts so
severe as to cause significant intrusion of the passenger compartment,
the systems are remarkably efficient. Seat belts are incorporated into
all motor vehicles currently sold for passenger use in the United States
and are present in more that ninety-five percent of all passenger
vehicles in use in the United States.!
To fully appreciate the life-saving and injury-reduction capacity of
seat belt restraint systems, it is necessary to examine several non-legal
topics which have direct bearing on what the law should reflect. In addi-
tion, these topics could prove to have practical application for the at-
torney attempting to establish the necessity for judicial acceptance of
the seat belt defense. These areas include:
1. the human and economic toll arising from automobile ac-
cidents;
2. the events that take place during an automobile collision in
terms of vehicle dynamics9 and occupant kinematics;" and
3. the effects of a seat belt restraint system upon occupant
kinematics."
(1972); Raphael, Before the Crash: How Biomechanics Reduces Fatalities and In-
juries, 10 WARD'S AUTO WORLD 51 (1974); Comment, Occupant Protection in
Automobiles-Air Bags and Other Passive Restraints: The State of the Art, The
Federal Standard and Beyond, 27 AMER. U.L. REV. 635 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Occupant Protection]; U. Seiffert and G. Borenius, Development Problems with
Inflatible Restraints in Small Passenger Vehicles, Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 720409, May 22-25, 1972).
NHTSA has found that air bags are not as effective as lap-shoulder belts in
the prevention of injuries from moderate, serious or fatal crashes. PROGRESS
REPORT, supra this note, at 7. Collateral dangers created by use of air bags,
especially inadvertent deployment risks, are described in Pacific Legal Founda-
tion v. Department of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
dangers were found to be outweighed by the benefits.
a See AM. SAFETY BELT COUNCIL, KEY FACTS IN SUPPORT OF SAFETY BELT USE
(1978); L. Patrick, Passive and Active Restraint Systems: Performance and
Benefit/Cost Comparison Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Paper No.
750389 (1975) (estimated that by 1978 100% of the vehicle population would be
equipped with lap belt shoulder harness systems). Interestingly, with the in-
troduction of the 1965 model year, vehicles were equipped with front seat lap
belts as standard equipment-years before this safety measure was required by
Federal Motor Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1979) (took effect
January 1, 1968).
9 Dynamics, in the laws of physics, refers to the production and causes of mo-
tion. R. RESNICK and D. HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 79.
'. Kinematics, in the laws of physics, refers to motion without regard to the
force that produces it. Id. at 32.
" Although both dynamics and kinematics may be used to describe the mo-
tion of a vehicle and occupant involved in a collision, this article will discuss
vehicles in terms of dynamics and occupant movement in terms of kinematics.
This approach is roughly accurate in reconstructing an accident and locating the
mechanism of occupant injury.
19801
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In view of judicial developments, it is imperative that such a multi-
disciplinary approach to the seat belt defense be attempted. With a
growing number of exceptions, courts have ruled that a defendant may
not seek to lessen or avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff failed
to use a restraint system. In this way the seat belt defense has frequent-
ly been rendered unavailable. 2 Too often, the judiciary has determined
as a matter of law that a reasonable person need not use a life-saving
mechanism, denying juries an opportunity to reach a different conclu-
sion. Thus, paradoxically, while courts have expanded the scope of in-
jury liability by asserting that damages could be enhanced if proved
with specificity, defendants were advised that proof of the benefits
which would have been provided through seat belt use was too
speculative. The courts appeared oblivious to the public policies suppor-
ting the seat belt defense. Only in recent years has a discernible trend
toward recognition of the seat belt defense begun to emerge. The
following discussion is offered to increase the understanding necessary
for a continuation of this judicial trend and to examine injury preven-
tion through mandatory seat belt use legislation.
II. THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC TOLL
The magnitude of human loss attendant to automobile accidents may
be better appreciated by comparing it to losses incurred in recent wars.
Since the emergence of the automobile as a major means of private
transportation, this nation has been engaged in three major military
conflicts which have resulted in the deaths of approximately 430,000
Americans."3 Yet, the total number of Americans killed during the
Korean or Vietnam conflicts was only slightly higher than motor vehicle
1 As a general rule, the seat belt defense is primarly used to mitigate
damages or to show that a defendant's acts were not the proximate cause of in-
jury. However, the failure to wear a seat belt can in itself be the proximate cause
of an injury where it occasions a loss of vehicle control after a non-injury causing
event. The seat belt defense should be available in either situation. See notes
143-54 infra and accompanying text.
's INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC (34th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ALMANAC], indicates the following losses:
Casualty
War Period Death Toll Toll
World War II 1941-1945 318,274 565,861
Korea 1950-1953 54,246 103,284
Vietnam 1960-1972 57,002 303,704
Id. at 395.
The Road Safety Coordinating Council of British Columbia in a pamphlet cir-
culated among editors of British Columbia newspapers noted that worldwide war
deaths in the twentieth century totalled 23.5 million, but that deaths from motor
vehicles during this some period totalled 25 million. British Columbia Road Safety
Coordinating Council, Seat Belt Presentation (Feb. 9, 1977) (pamphlet on file with




related deaths during any single year from 1970 through 1978. In fact
the loss of life from war pales in comparison to the death toll at-
tributable to the automobile."
The American public was reminded daily of events occurring in each
of these wars. With this knowledge, the public overwhelmingly elected
two Presidents largely because of a belief that they would terminate the
death and destruction. If the American public were as aware of the
enormity of the highway death toll, logic suggests that a similar public
outcry would occur. The government and the media have never sought
to bring the highway injury and death toll to the attention of the public
on a daily basis. More significantly, when efforts have been made to ad-
vise the American public of how to reduce this staggering injury and
death toll, they have been minimal, sporadic and incomplete."6
The annual toll in human life must be reduced. To do so requires
public awareness of the loss and the means available to reduce it. In
1977, there were some 49,500 deaths and 1.9 million disabling injuries
attributable to motor vehicle collisions. 7 In 1978, there were approx-
imately 2 million disabling injuries as well as approximately 51,000
deaths attributable to motor vehicle accidents."6 Of these disabling in-
juries it is safe to assume that a significant number resulted in some
degree of permanent disability. 9 Despite the enormous problem
" The ALMANAC, supra note 13 provides the following automobile fatality
figures based upon National Safety Council data:
1970 - 54,633 1973 - 55,511 1976 - 47,038
1971 -54,381 1974 -46,402 1977 -49,510
1972 - 56,278 1975 - 45,853 1978 - 51,500
Id at 812.
Simple addition indicates more lives were lost in automobile accidents during
the period 1970 - 1978 than in World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam
War combined. See notes 13 and 14 supra. Slightly different figures based upon
the Fatal Accident Reporting System of the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad.
have also been reported as follows: 1975 - 44,525; 1976 - 45,523; 1977 - 47,876; 1978 -
50,145. From 1975 to 1978 these figures show an increase in the fatality rate of
12.6% including a 4.7% increase from 1977 to 1978 alone. NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY AD., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY '78, 18 (1979).
"' In considering the Highway Safety Act of 1966, the Senate Report stated:
"The compelling need for the strong automobile safety legislation which the Com-
merce Committee is today reporting lies in these statistics: 1.6 million dead since
the coming of the automobile; over 50,000 to die this year." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966).
16 See notes 110-18 infra and accompanying text.
' NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 3 (1978 ed.) [hereinafter cited
as ACCIDENT FACTS, 1978]. 150,000 of the disabling injuries were permanent.
These permanent disabling injuries ranged from stiff joints or finger amputations
to complete paralysis.
'8 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 2 (preliminary condensed ed.
1979) [hereinafter cited as ACCIDENT FACTS, 1979].
1' There were 380,000 permanent disabling injuries for all accidents reported
1980]
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presented by these figures, the public remains more outraged by air-
craft mass disasters than the everyday automobile accident."0 The
means to substantially reduce the human loss due to automobile colli-
sions is currently available. If the general public can be persuaded or re-
quired to utilize seat belt restraint systems, the carnage will be greatly
reduced.
The direct and indirect economic costs of these injuries and deaths is
staggering. In 1977, the costs attributable to wage loss, medical ex-
penses, insurance administration and property damage from motor vehi-
cle accidents was 30.5 billion dollars.2 In 1978, the National Safety Coun-
cil reported that 34.2 billion dollars was attributable to motor vehicle ac-
cidents." These statistics do not include the massive costs incurred by
public agencies involved in automobile accident situations (such as
police, fire, and ambulance services, and the judiciary), indirect losses to
employers from off-the-job accidents, commercial cargo losses, or
damages awarded through litigation in excess of direct loss. 3 Assuming
that the economic loss for motor vehicle related injuries and deaths in
1979 will approximate those of 1977 and 1978, the total calculated loss
for these three years is in the range of 90 to 100 billion dollars. A
reasonable society would embrace the opportunity to reduce these
costs.
Although the concept of attributing a cost value to injuries or to life
is distressing and possibly abhorent to some, it is a basic element of our
tort compensation system. As pointed out by Transportation Secretary
Coleman, methods have been developed by economists and actuaries to
estimate the dollar value attributable to injury reduction. 4 One measur-
ing device is to determine lost potential income and resultant medical
costs together with legal expenses." Utilizing recognized procedures
and premised upon 1975 data, the Secretary estimated that if lap and
shoulder seat belt restraint systems were used 70 percent of the time,
4.6 billion dollars would have been saved. It was also estimated that 100
percent utilization would have resulted in a benefit of 6.5 billion
dollars."
by the National Safety Council for 1978. See ACCIDENT FACTS, 1979, supra note
17, at 1. This report also indicates that 49 percent of all accidents resulting in
death were motor vehicle related.
I Yet the death toll for all aircraft accidents in 1977 and 1978 was approx-
imately 3,000. ACCIDENTS FACTS, 1979, supra note 18, at 2.
21 ACCIDENTS FACTS, 1978 supra note 16, at 4. The total loss attributable to
motor vehicle accidents in 1977 was 32.5 billion. ALMANAC, supra note 13, at 391.
2" ACCIDENT FACTS, 1979, supra note 18, at 4.
2 Id.
'A See DEP'T OF TRANSP., SECRETARY'S DECISION CONCERNING MOTOR VEHICLE
OCCUPANT CRASH PROTECTION (1976) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S DECISION].
Id. at 41 n.49.




Another way to examine the economic impact of seat belt usage is to
utilize a methodology first set forth by Yale Professor Guido Calabresi
in the products liability area. 7 Common sense and the Calabresi
economic approach suggest that accident costs may be alleviated by
reducing the number and the severity of accidents, but automobile ac-
cidents are going to continue regardless of the improvements made in
vehicle design and driver education. An important focus, therefore, is
the reduction of injury severity. Recently, the result of such an
economic analysis in regard to the need for seat belt use legislation was
forcefully presented. 28 It was correctly asserted that the Calabresi goal
of effective use of resources can be attained in three ways. First, it may
be obtained through a general deterrence method which allocates the
costs to the cheapest cost avoider, but allows the market to determine
the desirability of particular activities and to make adjustments for in-
correct allocations. Second, and in the alternative, a specific deterrence
system may be used which allocates the costs to the best cost avoider
and collectively decides whether an activity or act is desirable based on
a benefit/cost analysis. Finally, the Calabresi goal may be reached
through a mixed system, which combines portions of both general and
specific deterrence.'
Conceivably, mandatory seat belt usage would allocate a proper por-
tion of the loss to the consumer. Maximization of economic and health
vailing expenses. Id. at 49 (Table 3).
The B.C. Presentations, supra note 13, indicates a similar view of the toll
though on a smaller scale. The report estimated that if seat belt use in British
Columbia were increased to 50% from the 20% level studied, some 168 lives
would have been saved of the 788 fatalities predicted for 1976. The tangible costs
saved would have been 11.5 million dollars; determined by valuing each life at
100,000 dollars and including direct hospital and medical costs, lost wages and
spinal injury savings. Other savings such as the costs of fireman and police in-
volvement were not included. The report asserted that an increase to 65% use
would result in a 20% decrease in fatalities. The fatality rate reduction could be
as high as 50% with greater use. Id.
In Sweden, an economic gain of 33 million United States dollars was reported
for 1975 as a direct result of increased seat belt use. The data was reported by
the Statens Trafiksakerhtsverk, cited in N. Bohlin, Twenty Years of Safety Belt
Experience and the Effect of Safety Belt Legislation in Sweden, in '79 INTERNA-
TION SYMPOSIUM ON SEAT BELTS [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIuM], 116, 120 (1979).
2 See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970). See also PERSPECTIVE ON TORT LAW (R. Rabin Ed. 1976);
Hlemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153
(1975); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference
in Law or Economics, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1978); Note, Reallocating the
Risk of Loss in Automobile Accidents by Means of Mandatory Seat Belt Use
Legislation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 91, 121-39 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Reallocating the Risk of Loss].
Note, Reallocating the Risk of Loss, supra note 27, at 121-39.
Id. at 131.
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benefits to society could then be attained. The manufacturer is currently
encouraged or required to develop safety devices and to be innovative
in its approach to safety with the goal to reduce the severity of injury
which occurs in unavoidable accident circumstances.30 To promote such
efforts and make the economic benefits practical instead of theoretical, a
commensurate duty must be imposed on the best cost avoider, the con-
sumer." In light of the knowledge available to the consumer, and the
relative ease of the burden imposed when balanced against the personal
and economic consequences of the harm, no reasonable economic or legal
argument can be raised to refute seat belt use legislation. Such legisla-
tion, or at least a more gradual and limited achievement of its objectives
through judicial decisions, is the best alternative under Calabresian
economic analysis.3
An evaluation of the costs of use and non-use of the automobile seat
belt, the cost of accident prevention by drivers and the deterrent effect
of liability rules establishes that failure to utilize an available seat belt
is economically undesirable. Economic efficiency would be increased by
changing the present liability rules:
Failure to avoid needless injuries is as wasteful as failure to
avoid needless accidents. Injuries should be prevented when
prevention is less expensive than the harm itself. In order to
minimize total costs, liability for each increment of harm should
be assigned to the party for whom prevention of the harm is
cheapest. This approach to accident litigation would reduce
waste of resources by recognizing that liability rules not only
settle disputes within the courtroom but affect behavior outside
it as well.3"
It is important to recognize the distinction between injury preventive
and accident-preventive precautions. In appropriate circumstances, the
distinction is readily made and should be a factor in allocating liability.
Courts and legislatures must realize that the costs of injury prevention
are sometimes best borne by the injured party, who could have avoided
the harm.
The cumulative effect of legislation such as safety regulations,'34 com-
" Id. at 136-39.
I /d.
Id at 139. A less complex economic approach utilizing factors similar to
those used in traditional negligence analysis (cost efficiency and transaction
costs) also shows that the duty to wear a seat belt is economically appropriate.
See Comment, Self-Protective Safety Devices: An Economic Analysis, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 421 (1973).
Id at 441.
E.g., Nat'l Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 1, 15 U.S.C. §§




pensation systems, 5 tax incentives, and judicial developments such as
the abolition of the privity requirement" or the development of strict
tort liability 7 may be to encourage trends which destroy the free enter-
prise system. One means to prevent this is to place entrepreneurial
risks into a proper balance with consumer risks,39 while promoting a
maximization of accident and injury reduction:'
On the one hand, the producer frequently has available the best
means of controlling the risk, both because knowledge of risk is
a prerequisite to control and because he or she can introduce
safer, albeit more costly, alternatives either by applying current
technology or by investing in research. On the other hand, the
user frequently can also control risk by avoiding foolish uses or
by making use of some specific knowledge about significant
alternatives that are in his or her control."
In the automotive field, accidents cannot be prevented and the cost of
producing an injury-free or injury-proof vehicle precludes the mass
marketing of such a vehicle." A more effective means to reduce injuries
is to combine preventive design components, such as energy absorbing
steering columns and padded dash boards, with wider use of presently
2056-57 (1979); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1978, § 1, 21 U.S.C. §§
301-92 (1978) and regulations issued thereunder.
' See e.g., Kenney and McCarthy, "No Fault" in Massachusetts, Chapter 670,
Acts of 1970-A Synopsis and Analysis, 55 MASS. L. Q. 23 (1970).
E.g., I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(H) (carryback provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code); I.R.C. § 537(b)(4) (product liability loss provisions).
7 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364
N.E.2d 267 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
" Calabresi, Products Liability: Curse or Bulwark of Free Enterprise, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 313 (1978).
40 Seat belt restraint systems reduce injury severity in many accident cir-
cumstances and can be viewed as a means to avoid or reduce accident severity
consistent with the Calabresi approach. In a smaller number of instances, reten-
tion of vehicle control is possible when a driver is belted. Such retention of con-
trol can avoid injury producing accidents entirely.
41 Calabresi, supra note 39 at 320 n.51.
4' Moreover, if each vehicle is to be built like an armored tank-in order
to do the job of a tank-other functional advantages must necessarily
suffer. A tank must, at the least, result in a purchase investment of
scores of thousands of dollars. Equivalent protection in ordinary
passenger cars may arguably prove less costly, but nevertheless at a pro
rata price probably out of reach of the ordinary user. The cost of making
a vehicle "crashproof" or "crashworthy" is inestimable.
Hoenig and Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles: The
Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 65 (1974).
1980]
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available seat belt restraint systems. The restraint system is simple,
economical and functional. The dangers of injury resulting from the
system itself are clearly outweighed by the injuries and losses it
prevents.'"
The automobile manufacturers have provided the consumer with a
positive means to minimize accident-injury severity. It is human and
economic waste for the consumer to ignore the use of a seat belt
restraint system. Human suffering and economics dictate that the con-
sumer be required to control the risk by applying his knowledge of the
significant protection afforded by seat belt use." Judicial decisions have
yet to reflect a general seat belt usage standard; legislation should and
perhaps will.
The human toll arising from automobile accidents is appalling and
shows no sign of abating. A substantial portion of this toll can be avoided
with minimal inconvenience and without additional cost to the con-
sumer. The economic benefits to be derived from seat belt use include
not only dollar savings, but also a reaffirmation of the free enterprise
system. A proper legislative response would immediately reduce the
number of motor vehicle related injuries and deaths, their resultant
costs" and a tremendous amount of human suffering.
III. THE PHYSICIST'S VIEW:
DYNAMICS AND KINEMATICS
Injury producing collisions occur in numerous ways due to combina-
tions of factors such as driver error, environmental hazard, road design
and vehicle malfunction. It is well known that the prevalent cause is
driver error. Nevertheless, from both legal and physics perspectives,
the cause of the accident has little bearing on the dynamics of the acci-
dent once the collision sequence commences.
Once a high-speed collision begins, the effects of dynamics and
kinematics overcome any efforts of the vehicle occupants to control
their movements. Occupant kinematics, the movements of the vehicle
occupant during a collision sequence, have been extensively studied."
,8 See note 26 supra, and notes 61-98 infra and accompanying text.
Specific knowledge of the benefits resulting from seat belt use has been
communicated through promotional and educational campaigns sponsored by
public agencies and private organizations, driver education programs in many
high schools, television programming and movie "shorts." See notes 108-18 infra
and accompanying text.
'1 One commentator has estimated the economic gain of mandated seat belt
usage to be 4.5 billion dollars. Note, Reallocating the Risk of Loss, supra note 27,
at 92. This estimate appears to be conservative. See notes 21-25 supra, and notes
64-80 infra and accompanying text.
I8 See generally Campbell, Seat Belt Effectiveness, Symposium supra note
26, at 163; Hoenig and Goetz, supra note 42, at 44; L. Griffin, Analysis of the




Injuries during collision can arise from various factors, including impact
with the interior of the vehicle, intrusion of an object into the passenger
compartment, or impact with an object or the ground after ejection
from the vehicle. During an accident-collision sequence, the deceleration
of the vehicle is so rapid that it cannot be fully appreciated or analyzed
in the absence of high-speed photography. The effect of this rapid
deceleration upon an unrestrainted object in the vehicle is virtually in-
stantaneous 7 as the velocity of the object continues until stopped. Auto-
mobile contact and the completion of the injury-causing impact often oc-
curs in a fraction of a second."8
The easiest way to determine the direction in which the occupant will
move upon impact is to picture the occupant moving toward the point of
impact. This simplification will provide the general initial direction of
movement, but is not truly accurate. The occupant's movement, in
actuality, remains basically unchanged from the direction in which the
vehicle was moving, The appearance is that of the occupant moving
toward the impact point, but in a more precise sense, the most signifi-
cant change of direction is that of the vehicle. 9
During a frontal collision the unrestrained driver moves forward and
most likely makes an initial contact with his knees againt the lower in-
strument panel. His movement continues in a forward direction forcing
the chest into the steering wheel or steering column system. At this
time, most of the torso is decelerating but the head remains unimpeded
and continues on to strike the windshield, the top of the instrument
panel or the steering wheel rim. What the head will strike is a function
of several factors, one of which is simply the height of the occupant. A
passenger moves in much the same fashion as the driver except that the
chest strikes the dash as the head continues forward into the windshield
A Review of the Literature, (Highway Safety Research Center, Univ. of North
Carolina, December 1973); A. Siegel, W. Van Wagoner and A. Nahum, Case Com-
parisons of Restrained and Unrestrained Occupants and Related Injury Patterns,
(Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 690245, 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Case Comparisons].
"7 See note 5 supra. Vivid illustrations of the vehicle and human collisions are
set forth in TRANSPORT CANADA, ROAD SAFETY, THE HUMAN COLLISION 1-3 (2d ed.,
1976) [hereinafter cited as THE HUMAN COLLISION].
For example, in a 30-35 miles per hour head-on collision, the unrestrained
occupant will travel at approximately 45 feet per second after impact and will
strike the dash or windshield within approximately .055 seconds. Occupant move-
ment will then decelerate drastically and his velocity relative to both the vehicle
and the road (as the vehicle will have come to almost a complete stop) will be vir-
tually zero in approximately .09 seconds. B.C. Presentation, supra note 13, at 4.
" In essence, the vehicle interior is being moved toward the driver as the
vehicle accommodates the forces imposed upon it. The vehicle is reacting in
accordance with the concepts of Newton's Third Law of Motion: for every action
or force there is an equal and opposite reaction. See R. RESNICK and D. HALLI-
DAY, supra note 5, at 87.
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or windshield frame. As the speed of the automobile at the time of the
impact increases, the velocity at which each occupant collides with the
vehicle interior also increases, thus the more serious the ensuing harm.
If the vehicle strikes an immovable barrier at approximately thirty-
three miles per hour, the mean average level forces necessary to pro-
duce a fatal injury are reached.5"
In a right-frontal impact, the occupant moves toward the right front
corner of the vehicle. A passenger moves toward the right side "A"
pillar-the point between the side glass and the windshield. Although
padded, this is an extremely dangerous point as the head can absorb the
benefits of the padding and still have enough force to cause permanent
brain damage or death. Similarly, in a left-frontal impact, the driver
does not move directly forward, but appears to move toward the point
of impact. The driver moves forward and laterally toward the left,
either brushing or by-passing the steering wheel. The shoulder or head
impacts at the front of the driver's door, the door header or near the
"A" pillar. In each of these situations serious injuries could be received
at speeds well below twenty-five miles per hour and even as low as ten
to fifteen miles per hour. 1
Even where there is adequte time to react before a collision, the vehi-
cle occupant cannot physically alter these kinematics. There is no place
to hide. The forces generated are far too severe and can reach an order
of magnitude above twenty-five G's" during an intersection collision
with both vehicles travelling at speeds no greater than twenty-five to
thirty miles per hour. Thus a person weighing 150 pounds will generate
a force of 3,750 pounds, which must be dissipated in less than one se-
cond. Even at far lesser speeds, the human being is incapable of with-
standing the forces which occur from such a sudden deceleration. 3
The danger that an unrestrained occupant poses to other occupants in
the vehicle is that he/she can directly or indirectly strike another per-
" Caster, Passive Protection at 50 Miles per Hour, 1-2 (Society of Automobile
Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 720445, 1972). The Department of Transportation
(DOT) reports that non-belted fatalities have been recorded at speeds as low as
12 miles per hour. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD., DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
How MANY OF THESE FAIRY TALES HAVE You TOLD? (1975). In Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974), the court found that "[tihere
was testimony - which was not seriously questioned - that experiments conducted
under the auspices of the Department of Transportation indicated that 'the
average barrier equivalent velocity for fatalities, the mean velocity is only 33
miles per hour . Id. at 1076 (footnote omitted).
15 See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD., DEPT OF TRANSP., How
MANY OF THESE FAIRY TALES HAVE You TOLD? (1975).
11 One "G" is the acceleration due to gravity, or 32 feet per second per second.
It is a measurement which indicates the force to which a body is subjected when
accelerated or decelerated. See R. RESNICK and D. HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 48.




son. This impact can result in direct injury due to body contact or in-
direct injury from forcing the second person to strike a portion of the
vehicle interior. One of the most dismaying effects of the occupant's loss
of body control occurs when a person holding a small child is thrown
forcibly against the child so that the child is crushed to death."4 These
unrestrained occupant injuries can be serious or fatal. Nevertheless no
significant attention was given to them until 1974."5
Although physically unable to prevent injury at the time of collision,
precautions can be taken before the accident. The simple expediency of
buckling an already available seat belt will drastically modify occupant
kinematics. The seat belt, unlike the human being, can normally with-
stand the forces generated in a collision." Although a person can partial-
ly slide under (submarine) a lap belt that is too loosely buckled, this
sliding represents a significant decrease of lower torso kinematics.
Since the lap belt is anchored solely over the pelvic region, the upper
torso can still move forward (jack-knifing) and thus permit some injury
potential. A properly functioning lap belt will prevent all cases of full
body ejection and will limit the extent of partial body ejection. Since the
hips are fixed, thereby fixing the body's center of gravity, no forward
motion of the full body will occur and the upper torso can extend no fur-
ther than the torso's length permits. The number of body parts making
contact with either the vehicle interior or an intruding object is thereby
limited. Moreover, since the full body weight as increased by the G
forces is not involved, the severity of the impact may also be reduced.
When the modern-day, three-point system consisting of a lap belt and
shoulder harness is in use, the effects upon kinematics are more pro-
nounced. No significant body movement of the lower or upper torso is
possible and lateral movement is greatly reduced. Although a small
potential for partial lateral ejection remains, it is of limited significance.
In order for a serious injury to occur, there must be severe motion of
the head and neck, significant passenger compartment intrusion, or a
Id. at 5.
Hulke, Sherman & O'Day, The Hazard of the Unrestrained Occupant, 16 J.
TRAUMA 383 (1978) (first presented at the 18th Conference of the American
Association for Automotive Medicine in 1974). See also, THE HUMAN COLLISION,
supra note 47, at 5. One form of "indirect" striking takes place when a rear seat
passenger hits the front seat forcing it into the front seat occupant.
- 49 C.F.R. § 571.209 (1977), establishes requirements for seat belt
assemblies. One commentator has analyzed malfunction rates of lap and shoulder
belts as well as lap belts alone. See R. HALL, FACT BOOK: A SUMMARY OF INFOR-
MATION ABOUT TOWAWAY ACCIDENTS INVOLVING 1973-1975 MODEL CARS
(Highway Safety Research Center, Univ. of North Carolina, 1976). Malfunction is
a recognized problem, but appears to be one of minimal importance. Although
some vehicles displayed a relatively high propensity for seat belt malfunction,
the overall failure rate for all vehicles studied ranged from 0.6 percent to under 4
percent. See id., tables 225 and 226. Even these figures appear to be higher than
normal.
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force sufficient to negate the benefits of body restraint. 7 The likelihood
of severe head or neck movement is substantially reduced by the
passive protection offered by head restraints." Injury producing
passenger compartment intrusion requires severe accident cir-
cumstances and it is unlikely that any device now technologically feasi-
ble could preclude injuries from this source. Similarly, if the forces are
so great as to cause serious injury despite occupant restraint, it is
highly unlikely that any available safety device could have prevented in-
jury.
Driver kinematics upon impact, altered by use of a seat belt, have
been described as follows:
[Tihe car strikes and begins rapidly to stop. Since the driver is
fastened to the car by the seat belt, he slams against the belt
and immediately begins to slow down too. During that crucial
split second instead of sliding freely across the seat, he is being
held in place and begins to slow down with the car. This means
that the stopping force acting on the driver is spread out over a
longer time and a longer distance, and he more nearly approx-
imates the deceleration pattern of the car, as contrasted to the
shorter and more severe deceleration time suffered by the
unbelted driver. A longer deceleration time means that lower
"G" forces are acting on his body. 9
Despite the effects of a seat belt restraint system, injuries will occur
I A noted authority specified three methods by which a seat belted occupant
could be injured, (1) loads above the injury threshold, (2) excessive movement of
the belt and (3) passenger compartment intrusion. Intrusion is noted as the most
pervasive. Trinca, Medical Aspects of Seat Belt Usage, SYMPOsIuM, supra note 26
at 151, 152.
Ejection of vehicle occupants has also been noted as a primary injury source
since the first studies of automobile safety were made. Such ejections were
significantly reduced through redesign of vehicle door and door latch systems
consistent with technological capacity and recommendations of the Society of
Automotive Engineers. Nevertheless, ejection through inadvertent door open-
ings or through window areas remain a significant injury hazard to the
unrestrained vehicle occupant. See generally, R. HALL, FACT BOOK, A SUMMARY
OF INFORMATION ABOUT TOWAWAY ACCIDENTS INVOLVING 1973-1975 MODEL CARS;
A. Gross, Accident Motorist Ejection and Door Latching Systems (Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 817A (1964)); D. Huelke and H. Sherman,
Automobile Occupant Ejection Through The Side Door Glass (Automotive
Engineering Congress, Detroit, Mich. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
Paper No. 710076 (Jan. 1971)); J. Moore and B. Tourin, A Study of Automobile
Doors Opening Under Crash Conditions, Automobile Crash Injury Research
(1954).
At least one study strongly suggests that emphasis upon ejection related
spinal cord injury may be too great. Burke, Spinal Cord Injuries and Seat Belts, 2
MED. J. AUSTRALIA 801 (1973).
Head restraints have been required since 1969. 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 (1980).




during automobile collisions. Seat belt restraint systems modify occu-
pant kinematics, but they cannot perform the impossible. Potential and
actual injury reduction through the use of such systems is substantial
and has been reported in numerous studies in the United States and
elsewhere," but it is also true that seat belt restraint systems can in-
duce injuries in some circumstances." Therefore for a full evaluation of
the benefits of a mandatory seat belt use law, it is necessary to deter-
mine what the injury reducing potential is and to determine whether
seat belt induced injuries are comparable in either quantity or quality to
injuries sustained by unrestrained occupants. As will be shown, the
number of injuries and fatalities avoided is high, whereas the number of
seat belt induced injuries, especially of a severe nature, is extremely
low.
IV. MEDICAL ASPECTS OF SEAT BELT USE
A. Injury Reduction
Seat belt restraint systems are the single best method available to
significantly reduce the number of serious and fatal injuries caused by
motor vehicle accidents. These beneficial effects have been known for
over a generation. Twenty-two years ago, it was noted that "[t]he use of
properly designed and installed seat belts . .. not only protects the
wearer from the risks associated with ejection, but also reduces the
force with which he is likely to strike objects within the passenger com-
partment." 2
See notes 26 supra and 62-84 infra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 85-98 infra and accompanying text.
62 Tourin, Ejection and Automobile Fatalities, 73 PUBLIC HEALTH REPTS. 381,
389 (1958). See also J. Moore and B. Tourin, A Study of Automobile Doors Open-
ing Under Crash Conditions, in AUTOMOBILE CRASH INJURY RESEARCH (1954).
Tourin conservatively estimated that prevention of ejection alone would save ap-
proximately 5,500 lives annually. Five years later a similar estimate, that 5,000
lives would be saved annually by preventing ejection, was made. B.J. Campbell
and J.K. Kihlberg, Seat Belt Effectiveness in the Non-Ejection Situation, 7th
STAPP CAR CRASH CONF. 177 (1963).
The benefits of seat belt use have been summarized by the Chairman of the
Road Trauma Committee, Royal Australian College of Surgeons, as:
Seat belt restraint remains the single most effective measure in protect-
ing vehicle occupants against death and serious injury in road crashes.
It is estimated that serious and fatal injuries are reduced by 65-80/o and
moderate injuries by 40-60% by the wearing of seat belts. ...
If the present 14% wearing rate by motorists in the U.S.A. was in-
creased to 70/o, some 7,500 lives would be saved each year ....
A restrained occupant has a ten times less chance of being ejected in a
road crash than an unrestrained occupant.
Total restraint removes the threat of strapped occupants being sub-
jected to excessive loading from unrestrained occupants.
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Seat belt efficiency is best determined by its correlation to specific in-
juries and injury levels. Injury levels are generally measured by the Ab-
breviated Injury Scale, an internationally recognized categorization-of-
injury system that scales injuries according to severity. 3 Estimates of
the number of lives that have been saved and can be saved in the future
by use of the seat belt vary, but these estimates consistently suggest
significant life saving potential." In 1971, it was estimated that seat
belts saved between 2,800 and 3,500 lives in the United States and
Intrusion of the occupant space is the most important single factor in
determining the risk of injury in a given crash....
The benefits of seat belts should not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with a car's structure, its geometry and interior impact at-
tenuating systems....
The fitting of seat belts is highly cost effective because of the value of
injuries prevented and all fatalities saved are a bonus....
Trinca, Medical Aspects of Seat Belt Usage, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26 at 151.
[citations omitted].
" The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) rates injuries on the following scale
without regard to cummulative effect:
0 - no injury;
1 -minor injury;
2 - moderate injury, not dangerous;
3 - severe injury, not life-threatening;
4 - serious injury, life-threatening, survival probable;
5 - critical injury, survival uncertain; and,
6 - maximum injury, currently untreatable (fatal).
The Overall Accident Injury Scale (OAIS) describes the cumulative effect of in-juries sustained. The scale is similar to the AIS. Throughout this article, AIS
data will be utilized.
" See N. Bohlin, A Statistical Analysis of 28,000 Accident Cases With Em-
phasis on Occupant Restraint Value, 11TH STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE 229
(1967), abstract reprinted in 12 TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REVIEW 29 (1968). Mr.
Bohlin found that use of Volvo's three-point harness reduced injuries between 40
percent and 90 percent depending on the accident, speed and type of injury. He
also noted that non-belted occupants suffered fatal injuries from collisions at all
speeds but that none of the belted occupants were fatally injured from collision
speeds below 60 mph. See also, Levine and Campbell, The Energy Absorbing
Steering System in the Reduction of Injuries, 4 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 106 (1972);
J. Kihlberg, Efficacy of Seat Belts In Injury and Noninjury Crashes in Rural
Utah; Technical Report, (Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., May, 1969); D.
Levine and B. Campbell, Effectiveness of Lap Seat Belts and the Energy Absorb-
ing Steering System in the Reduction of Injuries (Safety Research Center, Univ.
of North Carolina, Nov. 1971); A Study of Seat Restraint Use and Effectiveness
in Traffic Accidents (Highway Safety Foundation, Jan. 1970); B. Tourin & J. Gar-
rett, Safety Belt Effectiveness in Rural California Automobile Accidents (Cornell
Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., Feb. 1970). Levine and Campbell found that seat
belt' use would reduce serious injury by 43 percent. Another commentator
estimated that lap belts reduce death and serious injury to drivers by 40-50 per-
cent and increase the probability that a vehicle occupant will sustain no injury. L.
Griffin, supra note 46, at 3-4.
[Vol. 29:217
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would have prevented 8,000 to 10,000 fatalities had all the involved vehi-
cle occupants worn the available seat belt system. 5 However, an an-
ticipated 100% seat belt usage is unrealistic, and a better evaluation
was reached by former Transportation Secretary Coleman who con-
cluded: "If seat belt use were increased to 70% or if all cars were equip-
ped with passive restraints, approximately 10,000 lives would be saved
annually."66 Additionally, he determined, based upon data for the 1975
car population and fatality rates, that such utilization would prevent
11,500 fatalities and 162,000 injuries of the AIS two through five levels
annually."
A noticeable decline in automobile fatalities was observed in Victoria,
Australia after it adopted mandatory seat belt use legislation. Accord-
ing to one report, during 1971 driver and passenger fatalities in Victoria
dropped 15% and 19% respectively, compared with an increase of 2%
for drivers and no change for passengers in the remainder of Australia."'
The report also indicated that a reduction of 2,500 fatalities from the
number anticipated for an eight year period ending in 1978, a 32%
decrease, was primarily attributable to seat belt use.69 Such seat belt
use also accounted for a 42% reduction in serious injuries.0 These
results were achieved even though the number of vehicle miles travelled
during the years had increased.7 A 1975 hospital survey in Victoria
dramatically reinforced these findings." The survey revealed that over
a five-year period of sustained high seat belt use, significant reduction
of specific injuries was found."
65 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS (1972 ed.). See also
ACCIDENT FACTS, 1978, supra note 17, at 53.
66 SECRETARY'S DECISION, supra note 24, at 29.
67 Id. at 40. See note 63 supra.
Joubert, Development and Effects of Seat Belt Laws in Australia, SYM-
POSIUM, supra note 26, at 126.
SId. at 129.
70 Id.
7 Id. at 130.
7" Trinca, supra note 57, at 152.
71 Id. This report can be summarized as follows:
Percent of Reduction Percent of Reduction
Fatal Injury Site (frontal collision) (rollover collision)
Head 82 80
Chest 53 67
Abdominal 30 + 48
Serious Injury Site Percent of Reduction
Eye 87
Facial and Chest 50
Knee Cap and Hip 40
Spinal Cord 27
This report also puts to rest the myth that seat belts are particularly
1980]
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Beneficial results from seat belt usage are contingent upon two fac-
tors: "[T]he usage of restraint and the injury reducing effects of the
restraint when used."74 Utilizing reports from Australia, the United
Kingdom, Sweden and the United States, a Swedish expert, Bohlin, con-
cluded that the three-point seat belt restraint system has a high and
documented injury mitigating effect. 5 A viewing of the most recent
analysis of the Volvo seat belt restraint system verifies this conclusion.
7 6
As with other studies, reduction of minor injuries was moderate (24%),
but more significant was the substantial reduction in severe injuries
(68% on the average and 74/o for front seat passengers).7 Sweden's
compulsory use law was found to be of great value and directly respon-
sible for a 45% reduction in severe injuries for drivers and 67% for
passengers. 8 Severe or fatal head and chest injuries were similarly
reduced by 63% and 52% respectively. 9
Another research group analyzed eighty crashes in which the authors
conducted on-the-scene accident investigations." The crashes resulted in
101 front seat occupant fatalities and of these, only four victims had
their seat belts fastened, two were wearing only lap belts.8 Com-
parisons and conclusions were made as to each type of restraint system
currently available (lap belts, lap-shoulder belts, air bag alone, air bag
dangerous to pregnant women. In severe crashes the maternal death rate for
unrestrained mothers is double that of belted mothers and fetal loss has a four
times greater chance of occurring if the mother is ejected. Id. at 153. Despite the
possibility of belt-caused injuries to pregnant women and the fetus, the overall
chance of survival and avoidance of serious injury is much greater if the belt is
worn. Id. See also P. Costiloe and W. Crosby, The Effect of Lap Belt Restraint on
Pregnant Victims of Automobile Collisions, in PROCEEDINGS, 14TH ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION AUTOMOTIVE MEDICINE 97 (1970). An earlier
report premised upon a single incident suggested that a design modification of
seat belts should be made for pregnant women. Rubovits, Traumatic Rupture of
the Pregnant Uterus From "Seat Belt"Injury, 90 AM. J. OBS. AND GYN. 828 (1964).
The primary reason for such injuries appears to be that the belt is worn high,
over the abdomen, instead of properly worn below the "bulge."
74 N. Bohlin, supra note 26, at 118.
75 Id
76 N. Bohlin, Fifteen years with the Three-point Safety Belt, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENT AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE (1977).
7 N. Bohlin, supra note 26, at 120.
78 Id at 121.
" Id These injury and fatality reductions were at least partially the result of
the compulsory use law in this comparison of 3,000 pre-law and 2,000 post-law
cases.
' D. Huelke, Effectiveness of Current and Future Restraint Systems in Fatal
and Serious Automobile Crashes, (Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Paper
No. 790,323, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Current and Future Restraint Systems].
" Id. at 1. In addition, the authors analyzed 70 instances in which serious in-




plus lap belt and passive belt system), but only lap-shoulder belts, the
prevalent system used in the United States, will be discussed. It was
determined from specific accident circumstances that between 42 and 57
percent of the fatalities would have occurred regardless of the restraint
system, thus the study concluded that 32 percent of the fatalities would
have been avoided had lap-shoulder belt systems been in use.82
This study establishes that lap-shoulder belts may prevent approx-
imately one-third of the fatalities that would otherwise occur to front
seat occupants in severe accident circumstances. Noting that Secretary
Coleman's decision indicated a total of 27,200 front seat occupant
fatalities for its study period,3 the above conclusion indicates that at
least 7,344 and perhaps as many as 13,872 lives could have been saved
had restraint systems been used."4
' Id. at 3. This proportion was significantly less than that suggested by other
studies. See, e.g., Rininger and Boak, Lap-Shoulder Belt Effectiveness, PRO-
CEEDINGS, 20TH ANN. CONF. OF AM. A. AUTOMOTIVE MED. (1976) (77%); R. Hall,
supra note 56 (55%). Even prior studies by Huelke indicated a higher percentage.
See D. Huelke, T. Lawson, R. Scott, J. Marsh IV, The Effectiveness of Belt
Systems in Frontal and Rollover Crashes, (Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Paper No. 770148, Feb. 28-March 4, 1977) (57-91/o) [hereinafter cited as
Frontal and Rollover Crashes].
83 SECRETARY'S DECISION, supra note 24.
" As indicated (see, note 82 supra) some studies showed higher injury reduc-
tion percentages. See also PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6. This study provided
injury and fatality reduction data based upon the Restraint System Effectiveness
Program (RSEP) and National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) data. Lap belt-
shoulder harness systems reduced the rates by the following percentages:
RSEP NCSS
Fatal 55 48
AIS 4-5 55 61
AIS 3 57 61
AIS 2 57 61
Id at 17.
A 1976 study, D. Huelke, T. Lawson, Lower Torso Injuries and Automobile
Seat Belts, (Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 760370, Feb. 23-27
(1976), confined its examination to lumbar spine, abdominal and pelvic injuries. It
addressed the categories of injury most often attributed to lap belt use as
distinct from lap shoulder-belt use. The study found that there was an increase of
50% in the "no injury" category for lap belt users over non-users. At the serious
injury level of AIS 3-5, (note 60 supra) there was a significant overall reduction of
injuries. At this more serious injury level, pelvic injuries were sustained by 28%
of the unrestrained occupants but only 9/o of the lap belted; abdominal injuries
by 27% of the unrestrained, 13% of the lap belted. Only in the case of lumbar
spine injuries did the lap belted occupants receive more frequent injuries than
their unrestrained counterparts. Id. at 3. This increase would probably be
eliminated with use of a three point restraint system. See also Frontal and
Rollover Crashes, note 82 supra.
The fatality reduction would not be at the expense of having survivors sus-
tain serious injuries. D. Huelke, Death and Injuries Prevented by Lap Shoulder
Belt Usage in the United States, in SYMPOSIUM supra note 26 at 160.
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B. Injury Caused by Seat Belt Use
Often it is argued that seat belts create as many dangers as they
eliminate. One of the primary dangers allegedly related to seat belt use
is the claim that vehicle occupants will be trapped in the vehicle and
subjected to an increased danger from either drowning or fire. One
study evaluating the assertion found that "[f]ears that the occupant is
more likely to be trapped if the belt is worn are not borne out by the
data. '8 5 The study recognized the existence of seat belt induced injury
and placed this type of injury into proper perspective:
One of the main detriments to seat belts as an injury preventing
countermeasure is that seat belts themselves cause injuries.
However, one can see that with the exception of the "probable"
category, the belt caused injuries are much less costly (and
hence less severe) than the non-belted caused injuries .... Belt
caused injuries are primarily contusions and pains in the hip, ab-
domen and chest. 6
A similar recognition of seat belt induced injuries viewed within proper
parameters was made in a Swedish report. 7 Although the three point
restraint system reduced AIS two to six level injuries by fifty percent,
an increase in AIS one to two level chest injuries of twenty-seven per-
cent was reported.8 This finding was consistent with prior experience
which suggested that seat belt use can be associated with minor to
moderate chest injuries.8 As to specific areas of injury the report in-
dicated that:
Minor to moderate chest injuries (rib fractures) are the "typical"
belt induced injury .... Severe abdominal injuries as reported
by various researchers is very unique .... Lap strap related in-
juries are of a minor degree when they appear.
I R. Hall, supra. note 56, at 241. An earlier study found that only one-half of
one percent of all injury producing accidents were followed by fire or submersion.
Gagen, Seat Belts: No Longer Why, But Why Not?, Today's Health, July 1960, at
26, cited in Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.2d 362, 392 n.12, 149 N.W.2d 626, 643 n.12
(1967). A study of belted drivers who were killed in motor vehicle accidents in On-
tario, Canada from 1972-75 disclosed a total of 175 fatalities of which only three
died in a burning or submerged vehicle (.017%b). In two of the years studied no
belted driver died as a result of fire or water. The report stressed the importance
of a seat belt in keeping the vehicle occupant conscious. THE HUMAN COLLISION,
supra note 46, at 15. Another report indicates that approximately 1,500 lives are
lost annually in the United States due to post-accident fires. This suggests a
slightly higher incidence of post-accident fires. 4 PROD. SAFETY NEWS 1 (No. 3,
March, 1976).
R. Hall, supra note 56, at 214.
' N. Bohlin, supra note 25.
" Id. at 121 (Table 9). See note 63 supra.




The occurrence of severe abdominal injuries is certainly related
to a poor belt design with the buckle positioned high up....
Clavicle fractures are rare in frontal impacts, but appear
sometimes in side impacts.
Injuries to head and face are not a major problem ......
The experience in Australia similarly suggests that there is little
evidence that properly worn belts cause serious injury.' From a medical
perspective, seat belt-induced injuries are less severe than those that
would have been sustained without them. Belt-produced injury is rare
and generally confined to abrasions and bruising of the chest and ab-
domen, with exceedingly rare head and neck injuries in the absence of
head contact. Serious abdominal injuries have been noted in the elderly
and improperly worn belts increase the likelihood of serious abdominal
injury (ruptured viscera) and injury to the cartoid artery. 92
Reports of fatal neck injury due to seat belts were presented in an
early study based on the Swedish experience with diagonal belts.93 In
each of the three fatal cases reported, the victim probably had his lower
jaw caught in the belt when the person was ejected.9 ' It appears that
such slipping could not have occurred had a lap belt been worn in addi-
tion to the diagonal belt.9
Most of the reported belt induced injuries involve the abdominal or
pelvic areas with injuries such as ruptures of the pancreas or spleen and
pelvic fractures.96 Conspicuously absent from clinical data presented has
" Id. at 123 (emphasis omitted).
" Trinca, supra note 57.
Id. at 152.
Saldeen, Fatal Neck Injuries Caused by Use of Diagonal Safety Belts, 7, J.
TRAUMA 856 (1967). Similarly, many of the adverse reports found in the United
States are of questionable validity in that the cases studied involved early seat
belt systems. See, e.g., Fletcher and Brogden, Seat Belt Fractures of the Spine
and Sternum, 200 J. AM. MED. A. 167 (1967); Howland, Curry and Buffington,
Fulcrum Fractures of Lumber Spine, 193 J. AM. MED. A. 240 (1965).
" Saldeen, supra note 93, at 862.
In Europe, unlike the United States, early restraint systems often utilized
only a diagonal belt without a supplementary lap belt. The likelihood of such in-
juries occurring with modern retraint systems is virtually non-existent. See
generally, L. Patrick, COMPARISON OF THREE POINT HARNESS AND LABORATORY
DATA, FINAL REPORT (1974). In fact, modern passive belt systems are designed to
preclude such slipping. See PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
" See Fish and Wright, The Seat Belt Syndrome - Does it Exist? 5 J.
TRAUMA 746 (1965) (concluding that the injuries due to seat belt use are less im-
portant than the death and injury prevented); Sube, Seat Belt Trauma to the Ab-
domen, 113 AM. J. SURGERY 364 (1967) (attributing such injuries to improperly
worn belts); and Tolins, An Unusual Injury Due to the Seat Belt, 4 J. TRAUMA
397 (1964) (premised upon a case history of "seat belt syndrome"). Other commen-
tators have indicated a lower percentage of serious lower body injuries to belt
users than non-users and found that the number of injuries traceable to the belt
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been evidence of belt induced fatalities even though there are re-
cognized unsubstantiated claims of such occurrences. In any event,
many of these belt induced injuries will be avoided as modern three-
point systems replace earlier model seat belt restraints.7
Among the nation's leading experts it is evident that the risk of
serious seat belt induced injuries is perceived as minimal. In this
regard, one such expert concluded:
... I acknowledge that we have all heard of isolated instances in
which belts are supposed to have made the situation worse. We
have heard speculations as to various unusual crash cir-
cumstances where the belt is said to be ineffective. Such cases
are difficult to trace and tend to vanish like smoke when one
tries to locate them.98
V. MANDATORY SEAT BELT USE LEGISLATION
A. The Debate
The primary arguments against mandatory seat belt use legislation
are not related to the effectiveness of seat belts as a means to reduce in-
jury and death, the technical aspects of the system, or even to asserted
constitutional inhibitions." Instead they revolve about asserted public
resistance and the political ramifications of such resistance.'00
itself was small. Garrett and Braunstein, The Seat Belt Syndrome, 2 J. TRAUMA
220 (1960). See also, McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C. App. 1976).
' See, e.g., W. Reidelbach, Recent and Future Improvements in Seat Belt
Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENT AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE (1977); G.J.
Sheahan, Recent Improvement in Seat Belt Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENT
AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE 232 (1977).
Campbell, supra note 46, at 166.
See notes 119-33 infra and accompanying text.
"® Successful implementation of mandatory use legislation was rejected as an
alternative by Secretary Coleman for precisely such reasons:
I have rejected this alternative [mandatory usage] because I believe that
a Federal requirement of such laws is politically [in]feasible [sic]. Both
the public record and our past experiences with Federal efforts to en-
courage the enactment of belt use laws indicate that a highway safety
standard mandating that each state take action to increase belt use
could not be sustained. Recent experience . . . also points to the
likelihood of public rejection of such a proposal.
SECRETARY'S DECISION, supra note 24, at 63. The "recent experience" mentioned
by Secretary Coleman appeared to be the public debate which led to Congres-
sional repeal of the safety interlock provisions of F.M.V.S.S. 208. See Pub. L. No.
93-492, 88 Stat. 1470 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS
1701-02 (repealed safety interlock provision of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety




Reasons for non-enactment of seat belt use laws in the United States
have been presented in several versions.' These reasons have been
utilized by opponents of use legislation to prevent enactment of bills
pending in over thirty states. 2 With the exception of at least one
municipality, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Rhode Island, no
use laws are in effect in the United States. 3 This could be due to the
belief that the American public will largely violate the law and that en-
forcement officials are effectively powerless. Regardless of whether con-
gress will consider the question of mandatory seat belt use legislation,
the State legislative branches should continue to do so.' 4
only 60%, based on available data, which thereby indicated that 40% of the peo-
ple whose vehicles were so equipped chose to defeat the system. SECRETARY'S
DECISION, supra note 24, at A-8.
Another survey concluded that there was an 80% use rate in actual situations.
OPINION RESEARCH CORP., SAFETY BELT USAGE: SURVEY OF CARS IN THE TRAFFIC
POPULATION (Dec. 1978) (report prepared for U.S. Dep't. Transp.). See also
TEKNEKRAN RESEARCH, INC., 1979 SURVEY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS (July 1979)
(report prepared for U.S. Dep't. Transp. (32% of respondents indicated that they
would disconnect a passive belt system, 38% believed strongly in the passive
system and 25% would tolerate such a system).
I" One observer believed the reasons to be: 1) the National Highway Traffic
Safety Ad. (NHTSA) belief that the American motorist cannot be made to buckle
up; 2) emphasis on the air bag to denigrate seat belts; 3) the safety interlock ex-
perience; and 4) the absence of adequate data to document the benefits of manda-
tory use laws. C.H. Pulley, Safety Belt Use Laws-The World Follows
Australia's Leadership in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENT AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE 11-15
(1977).
Another commentator, reflecting on the Congressional attitude, concluded
that it was highly unlikely that mandatory seat belt use laws would be enacted
even though higher use rates could not be attained without them. His review of a
report by the House Sub-Committee on Consumer Protection and Finance sug-
gested that this conclusion was due to Congressional disdain, consumer
resistance, lack of adequate enforcement resources and the difficulty of nighttime
enforcement. See OCCUPANT PROTECTION, supra note 6, at 648.
102 E.g., Mich. S. Bill No. 399 (1979); N.J. Assembly Bill No. 785 (1978). Among
the various states, several have passed the legislation but only in one house of
the legislature. See Pulley, A Report of the Efforts Throughout the World to In-
crease Seat Belt Usage, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26, at 112.
10 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 1212 (1975). The City of Brooklyn, Ohio probably
was the first political subdivision in the United States to adopt a mandatory seat
belt use law. The ordinance was adopted in 1966. CODIFIED ORDINANCES OF THE
CITY OF BROOKLYN, 37.25. Adoption was premised upon the belief that seat belt
use "... . has caused a significant drop in bodily injury and deaths to motor vehicle
passengers and operators using same when involved in automobile accidents."
and because ". . . their use will curtail injury and death and the great pain, suffer-
ing and finanical loss which are a consequence thereof." City of Brooklyn, Ohio,
Ordinance No. 1966 - 18. Rhode Island requires persons driving public service
vehicles on highways to wear a seatbelt. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-23-41 (1962).
10 For purposes of this article, no position need be taken as to the relative
merits of federal versus state legislation although state legislation may be more
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Perhaps the most difficult question facing proponents of mandatory
seat belt use legislation is whether such legislation will be effective.
Mandatory use laws are in effect and proving beneficial in over twenty-
five nations or major political subdivisions. 0 5 Similar predictions of inef-
fectiveness based on low use rates and perceived resistance have been
avoided in these places through the utilization of public education cam-
paigns along with use legislation.10' By using education and legislation in
tandem, countries have successfully increased seat belt use even where
previous education drives, alone, often failed to substantially increase
usage.1"7 Despite these foreign successes, the educational effort in the
United States has been largely uncoordinated and sporadic,"8 thereby
likely to succeed. For a discussion of the federal/state distinction see Occupant
Protection, supra note 6. In view of the federal effort to mandate passive
restraint system and improve the comfort of seat belt systems, it is paradoxical
that the federal government refuses to require its use on vehicle operators. It is
economically wasteful to impose the costs of the research development and in-
stallation of such systems upon manufacturers and consumers alike while failing
to obtain the injury prevention benefits.
11 See, e.g., Note, Reallocating the Risk of Loss, supra note 27, at 103; Pulley,
supra note 101, at 12.
'0 See R. Andreasson and K. Ross, Effects of Sweden's Seat Belt Laws, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR ACCIDENT AND TRAFFIC MEDICINE 45 (1977); J.P. Chockiewiez
and B. Dubarry, Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Legislation in France, id. at 40;
0. Due, The Danish Seat Belt Act, id. at 70; K. Seidenstecher, Laws on Manda-
tory Seat Belt Use in Germany and Short Evaluation of the International
Literature on Seat Belts, supra note 26, at 194; J.W. Snow, Seat Belt Legislation
in Ontario Canada.. Its History and Effects, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26, at 199.
Other nations such as Belgium, Israel, Finland, the Neverthelands, Norway,
Spain, Switzerland, and the Soviet Union have also adopted mandatory seat belt
use laws. Pulley, supra note 101, at 18.
107 See notes 105-06 supra.
106 Public information campaigns have been undertaken by the federal and
state governments, the National Safety Council, insurance companies and the
automobile industry in an effort to increase belt use rates. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAF-
FIC SAFETY AD., U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., OCCUPANT PROTECTION PROGRAM REPORT No.
2, at 7 (April, 1979). The National Highway and Transportation Safety Ad-
ministration has contracted to provide 2.5 million brochures through 4,000 super-
markets to explain automatic restraint systems. The agency has also produced
three versions of a film spot (lasting from 10 to 60 seconds) dealing with
automatic restraints and made them available to 600 television stations for show-
ing in their public service time. Id. at 25.
Many private organizations, particularly medical organizations, have joined in
the educational effort. Id. at 26. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has
produced several films, including "Crashes That Need Not Kill," which has been
seen by millions on television and in movie theatres. Id. at 27. High schools have
emphasized seat belt use in driver education courses.
The single most effective campaign has been the "buckle up for safety" theme
introduced by the National Safety Council. This is the most frequently recalled




achieving even less success in obtaining increased seat belt usage than
that obtained in other nations.
It may be that as a result of long term educational efforts, even
despite the lack of coordination, there have been changes in the at-
titudes and perceptions of the American public. To date these changes
have not increased the use rate," ' but the potential presently exists to
capitalize upon them. The attitudes and perceptions of the American
public in regard to safety belts and use laws are therefore not as clearly
adverse as commonly believed. Ongoing public opinion surveys reflect
changes in favor of belt use and mandatory seat belt use legislation."0
Publication efforts have been extremely effective because drivers who
remember seeing or hearing seat belt safety advertisements are "more
likely to believe that safety belts protect an individual in the event of an
automobile accident than drivers who did not recall any such message.'11
Nearly 900/o of licensed drivers believe that belts protect automobile
occupants from injury during an accident. Yet many undervalue the
utility of belt use and do not associate such use with safe driving.
Future educational efforts should focus public attention on the nexus
between use of seat belts and safe driving. One method by which states
might emphasize the benefits of seat belt use would be to require all ap-
plicants for renewal of driver licenses to view a film depicting
automobile collision simulations utilizing restrained and unrestrained
dummies."2
Most drivers are unaware of the true risk of being involved in an acci-
dent (1 in 7 per year) or suffering a disabling injury due to an
automobile accident (1 in 67 per year)."' In one sample less than 25/0
recognized the actual risk of an accident and over one-third perceived
the risk at 1 in a 1,000." Although almost 50/0 of the group nationally
surveyed virtually never wore seat belts, the majority favored man-
tional sample. TEKNEKRON RESEARCH, INC., 1979 SURVEY OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
(July, 1979) (report prepared for U.S. Dep't Transp.).
"9 See note 62 supra.
"' TEKNEKRON RESEARCH, INC.,supra note 108, at 38.
. Id. at 67.
"' Id at 36. The administrative costs of such a procedure would be minimal.
Preparation of the film could be performed by the NHTSA, the National Safety
Council, the Insurance Institute, or the automotive industry. A similar procedure
is currently in use by many states to stress the importance of safe driving to per-
sons who have received certain types of traffic violations or who seek to have a
suspended license reinstated.
. Id at 10-12.
"' Id at 38. 84/o were in favor of a law requiring all children less than five
years old to ride in a special car safety seat. Over 60% were in favor of a law re-
quiring anyone less than 18 years old to wear a seat belt while 52% favored such
a law for everyone.
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datory use laws."5 Only 28% of those surveyed strongly opposed a
broad mandatory use law." '1
Despite the public's failure to perceive the true risk of being involved
in an automobile accident, the public evidences considerable concern
over the possibility of being injured in an automobile accident. 1 7 Public
appreciation of the dangers of automobile accident injuries can be made
more realistic and their appraisal of seat belt use more accurate through
comprehensive educational efforts. The experience in Sweden, Canada,
the United Kingdom and elsewhere indicates that publicity and/or
educational campaigns alone will not increase the use rate more than
five to fifteen percent.'
Legislative compulsion complemented by adequate publicity and
educational efforts has uniformily resulted in substantial and long
lasting increases in seat belt use. The tandem approach of legislation
and education is the means by which the injury reduction potential of
seat belt restraint systems can best be realized. If this reasonable ap-
proach is implemented, thousands of American lives will be saved an-
nually and tens of thousands of Americans will be spared serious injury.
B. The Constitutional Canard
If a mandatory seat belt use law is adopted, it will probably be sub-
jected to a constitutional attack. However, preliminary indications are
that such legislation would be held constitutional.'
Although there appears to be no reported decision in regard to the
few existing use laws in the United States or Puerto Rico, 2 ' there have
been numerous decisions in the analogous field of compulsory wearing
"I Id. at 39.
,16 Id
11 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANS., PUBLIC AT-
TITUDES TOWARD PASSIVE RESTRAINT SYSTEMS 4-5 (August, 1978).
118 SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26, at 118. However, mandatory use legislation
coupled with strong educational efforts has resulted in significant and permanent
increases in the use rate, reaching over 90/o in some areas. See generally, N.
Bohlin, Twenty years of Safety Belt Experience and the Effect of Safety Belt
Legislation in Sweden, in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26, at 199; Joubert, Develop-
ment and Effect of Seat Belt Laws in Australia, Symposium, supra note 26 at
128.
119 The Highway Safety Division of Virginia has reached this conclusion. See
W. AMES, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY SEAT BELT USE LEGISLATION
(Dec. 1972). The validity of motorcyclist mandatory headgear use laws has been
discussed by many commentators. See e.g., Note, Constitutional Law- Validity
of Safety Helmet Requirements, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 191 (1969); Note, Police
Power, Motorcycle Crash Helmet Laws Relation to Public Welfare, 1969 WIS. L.
REV. 320; Comment, Constitutionality of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet Legisla-
tion, 73 DICK. L. REV. 100 (1968).




of headgear for motorcyclists."' The headgear use statutes were ob-
viously enacted to reduce injuries to motorcyclists. Given the similar
underlying purposes for both types of legislation, drafters should be in-
clined to use constitutional headgear statutes as models for mandatory
seat belt use laws.
Potential constitutional attacks would most likely fall within three
categories: 1) the legislation is vague; 2) the legislation imposes an un-
due burden upon interestate commerce; and 3) that such legislation
would violate the equal protection clause."'2 None of these challenges
should be sufficient to overturn a well-drafted statute.
Concern over language problems supposedly inherent in drafting
mandatory seat belt use legislation is not well-founded. While am-
biguous or vague statutes are generally invalidated, 3 the legislative
branch, fully aware of this, constitutional requirement, can readily draft
a statute utilizing appropriately specific statutory language. The laws
already in effect worldwide and in Puerto Rico can serve as models.24
In the analogous area of motorcycle headgear laws, two courts have
considered and rejected claims that such laws impose an improper
burden on interestate commerce.'25 A New York court, in People v. Car-
michael,'2 reduced the issue to a single sentence: "a valid exercise of
121 See generally, Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970). Courts in over twenty
states have upheld motorcyclist headgear use statutes and have refused most
constitutional attacks. Id. However, a small number of judicial opinions have in-
validated such legislation primarily on the basis of a perceived violation of the
right to privacy. See People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969);
Evenhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So.2d 423 (La. App. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 212 (1969); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158
N.W.2d 72 (1968), overruled, City of Adrian, 67 Mich. App. 133, 240 N.W.2d 298,
affd, 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 252
N.E.2d 866 (1969).
The Ohio decision of State v. Betts, rejected an earlier appellate decision from
another county. State v. Craig, 19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E.2d 75 (1969). A subse-
quent appellate decision has also upheld the Ohio legislation. State v. Stouffer, 28
App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651 (1971).
'2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
" See, e.g., Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1962).
"A P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 1212 (1976) provides:
(a) Any person who drives or rides as a passenger in a public
thoroughfare in a motor vehicle which should be equipped with
safety belts ... and the belts of which are available and ade-
quate to be used, shall be bound to fasten said belt around his
body while the vehicle is being driven along the public
thoroughfares.
(b) This section shall not apply: [to specified groups]
The penalty for violation is set forth in P.R. LAWS AANN. tit. 9, § 1221 (1976).
Violation is a misdemeanor.
" See Love v. Bell, 465 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1970); People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc.
2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968).
'" 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968).
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police power is not rendered invalid because it may incidentally affect
interstate commerce.
In addition, courts might emphasize the minimal financial burden con-
nected with complying with use statutes in upholding seat belt use laws.
The imposition of seat belt use laws will not interefere with interstate
commerce. The act of buckling a seat belt is completed within seconds
and does not affect the ability of the driver to operate the vehicle.
Rather, by assisting the driver to remain in place, the use of seat belts
is arguably an aid to driving and is thus beneficial to interstate com-
merce. The stability provided by seat belts can help a driver retain con-
trol of his vehicle and avoid accidents, thereby promoting a smooth flow
of traffic."8
Mandatory seat belt use laws also need not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. When a matter is properly
subject to state regulation regarding public health, safety or morals, the
legislation will be upheld upon a finding that there is a proper basis for
it. A state enacting mandatory seat belt use legislation, even assuming
some encroachment upon personal liberty, could meet the standard of a
compelling interest as set forth in Roe v. Wade"2 and Bates v. Little
Rock."'0 Such a law would be necessary to the accomplishment of a per-
missable state policy 3 '- protection of the health and safety of its
citizenry. If the infringement is not characterized as fundamental, the
less stringent "rational basis" test"2 would be met.
In Simon v. Sargent,1" a three judge federal district court relied upon
evidence that motorcyclists were especially prone to serious head injury
as a basis for upholding a Massachusetts statute. 134 The court stated
that the Massachusetts legislature could distinguish between classes of
vehicle users because of the legitimate state interest in protecting
motorcycle riders from the additional dangers inherent in cycle
Id at 394, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
1 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
129 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
130 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
131 McLaughlin v. Flordia, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
1 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (right
of privacy argument was invoked to challenge laws prohibiting adults from using
marijuana in their homes); Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 N.E.2d 688 (Mass.
1978). The contested statute was upheld in Marcoux but was deemed invalid in
Ravin due to an absence of an adequate state interest.
'3 346 F. Supp. 277 (D.C. Mass.) aff'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 7 (West 1975). This statute was also
upheld in Commonwealth v. Howie, 354 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373, cert. denied,
393 U.S. 999, (1968), and Commonwealth v. Cowan, 344 N.E.2d 419 (App. 1976).




driving.'35 Emphasis was placed on the fact that injuries to motorcyclists
created costs not only to the injured party, but also to society in
general.'
The added protection afforded by a motor vehicle, when compared to
a motorcycle, is quite distinct from the protection needed when an
automobile collision occurs. In many accident situations, the structure of
the automobile is not capable of preventing injury that would be
prevented had a seat belt been in use.'37 A legislature can readily
discern a rational basis for imposing a safety belt use standard upon the
motor vehicle occupant. The motor vehicle occupant is in a class distinct
from the motorcyclist and thus in need of a different form of protection
against injury and death. Just as a helmet provides a unique form of
protection to the motorcyclist, seat belts provide a unique form of pro-
tection to the motor vehicle occupant.
In People v. Bennett' a lower New York court held that the im-
proper special class argument was without merit, but also discussed the
question of an asserted violation of the right to privacy. The court found
that there was a rational basis and connection between the helmet use
law and the safety purposes of such a law. The legislature was within its
rights to determine that injuries to motorcyclists would be greater in
the absence of helmets, therefore, the police power was properly invoked.
The right to privacy was viewed as a limited right not affecting the
legislation.'39 Other courts in the United States have also found this type
of legislation valid because it protects both the individual and the
general public.4 0
346 F. Supp. at 279.
K The court concluded:
From the moment of injury, society picks the person up off the highway;
delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him
with unemployment compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace
his lost job, and, if, the injury causes permanent disability, may assume
the responsibility for his and his family's continued subsistence. We do
not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only
he himself is concerned.
Id. The economic factors supporting such legislation have been relied upon in
other opinions. See, e.g., State v. Beeman, 541 P.2d 409 (Ariz. App. 1975); State v.
Acker, 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038 (1971); State v. Laitiner, 77 Wash. 2d 130,
459 P.2d 789 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1055 (1970). In State v. Acker, the court
observed: "Whenever a citizen becomes maimed or is killed, the entire public is
affected to some degree. As John Donne suggested, each citizen is a clod of the
entire whole, and when one citizen is diminished we all suffer." 26 Utah 2d at 106,
485 P.2d at 1039.
... See note 62 supra.
89 Misc. 2d 382, 391 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1977).
Id. at 386; 391 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
' State v. Also, 11 Ariz. App. 227, 463 P.2d 122 (1969); State v. Lee, 51 Hawaii
516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970); State v. Acker, 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038 (1971).
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As desireable as seat belt use legislation may be, enactment of such
laws in the near future cannot be anticipated. The judiciary can fill the
legislative void through application of the seat belt defense. Such ef-
forts are not adverse to public policy because the failure of the
legislature to act is not necessarily a reflection of public opinion.
Federal legislation specifically allows for a continuation of common law
developments.' The remainder of this article explores how the
judiciary can fill the legislative void through application of the seat belt
defense.
VI. SEAT BELT DEFENSE
Limitations on the use of the seat belt defense come from general
evidence principles, tort law and products liability law. The gossamer
barriers to use of the seat belt defense are surmountable.
A. Relevance and Related Issues
Application of the seat belt defense requires submission of factual
evidence to support contentions that either:
1) the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff would have
been reduced or prevented entirely; or
2) the accident would not have occured thereby precluding
recovery for any injuries.'
Under any legal theory of liability, factual evidence relating to seat belt
use and its effects is admissible only if relevant. The Federal Rules of
Evidence establish that all relevant evidence is admissible unless
specifically proscribed."' Relevant evidence not proscribed under the
rules can be excluded only if its probative value is outweighed by other
1 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976) provides: "Compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person
from any liability under common law." This provision has been interpreted to
permit development of the "crashworthiness" theory as consistent with
legislative goals. The Act does not indicate a Congressional intent to gain ex-
clusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968).
" The legal and engineering aspects of this assertion are distinct from those
which support the claim of injury prevention or reduction in accidents caused by
events unrelated to seat belt non-use and, therefore, will not be discussed herein.
Similarly, seat belt design flaws or defects as a cause of an accident or injury are
a distinct area and will also not be discussed. See, e.g., Fox v. Ford Motor Co.,
575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D.
1974); Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
10 FED. R. EVID. 402. Similar rules apply in most or all state courts. E.g., CAL.
EVID. CODE § 351-52. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184 (2d ed. E. CLEARY, 1972);




factors.'" A general definition of relevance is provided in Federal Rule
401 as "... evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence.""' 5 Despite
its superficial clarity this, and any definition of relevance, is inherently
ambiguous.
If an answer to a complaint is properly drafted, there is little doubt
that it will assert an affirmative defense making testimony relating to
seat belts relevant. The admissibility of such evidence will then be
determined solely upon its probative value as weighed against the
recognized bases for exclusion of relevant evidence. Such bases are set
forth in the Federal Rules 4 ' and have been summarized as: creation of
undue prejudice, hostility or sympathy;4 7 creation of confusing,
misleading or distracting tangential issues; 8 usurpation of more court
time than the evidence merits; 9 and creation of unfair surprise."
No valid argument can be made that a seat belt defense would create
undue prejudice, hostility or sympathy. The "prejudice" resulting is of a
substantive nature relating to a proper issue and thus is not of a nature
which would merit exclusion. Rather, the exclusionary term "prejudice"
is analogous to a concept of fairness; evidence is unfair if it could con-
veniently be offered in a manner which would engender less prejudice. 5 '
Although this interpretation might affect the manner in which seat belt
evidence is introduced, it cannot bar the evidence per se. From a more
general approach, the evidence is not prejudicial in that jurors are
presumably already aware of the existence of seat belts, their own non-
'" FED. R. EVID. 403. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 352; MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed. E. CLEARY 1972); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 9-10 (3d ed.
1940). It is clear, at least to be relevant under the Federal rules of evidence, that
the evidentiary fact submitted must relate to a factual or legal issue raised by
the pleadings as interpreted by applicable rules of procedure and substantive
law.
1"' FED. R. EVID. 401.
146 FED. R. EVID. 403.
".. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 862 (1979); Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1963); Byers v. San-
tiam Ford, Inc., 281 Or. 411, 574 P.2d 1122 (1978).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Cassasa, 588 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 909 (1979); Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
931 (1978); Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir. 1962).
".. See, e.g., L.E. Spitzer Co. Inc. v. Barron, 581 P.2d 213 (Ala. 1978); Jones v.
Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967).
15O See, e.g., Stoelting v. Hauck, 32 N.J. 87, 159 A.2d 385 (1960); Balian v.
General Corp., 121 N.J. Super. 118, 296 A.2d 317 (App. Div. 1972).
"' See State v. Fuson, 91 N.M. 366, 574 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1978); P. ROTHSTEIN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 70.3 - 70.4 (1978).
1980]
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1980
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
use of the seat belts and that a seat belt is a safety device. By focusing
on non-use, the defense may even unfortunately skew jurors against its
position by creating an "I do not use them either" syndrome thereby
resulting in an emotional bias in favor of the plaintiff based on the
jurors own similar conduct.
Similarly, seat belt evidence should not be barred by claims that it
falls within the purview of the concepts relating to confusion and
judicial efficiency. Although the evidence will often be technical and
complex, it is highly probative 152 and no more difficult to comprehend
than other design testimony that will be properly presented in an
automobile accident related action. Of course, defense counsel and
witnesses must present the evidence in a clear convincing manner or it
will be of no value. It is possible that such evidence will take con-
siderable time to present in a cohesive and forceful fashion, but the time
is justified by the probative value of the evidence. In proper cir-
cumstances, the court can impose such restrictions as are necessary for
the efficient administration of a trial. Moreover, by taking judicial
notice of the efficiency of seat belts as injury inhibitors, the court could
greatly reduce the time needed for the presentation of this aspect of the
case.
15
Finally, the Federal Rules will not exclude relevant evidence because
of alleged unfair surprise since modern discovery rules have largely
eliminated the element of surprise in civil litigation." In seat belt
defense litigation, the likelihood of surprise is virtually non-existent as
the defense will, of necessity, be asserted as an affirmative defense or
raised in mitigation of damages in the pleadings. Aside from the
pleadings, the nature of the facts to support the defense can be gleaned
by plaintiffs counsel through proper use of the discovery rules.
B. Auto Design and Personal Injury Cases
Issues pertaining to the seat belt defense arise in a variety of pat-
terns. Out of these, three patterns predominate: personal injury actions
where one car occupant sues the driver of another car; design defect or
component malfunction litigation brought against an auto seller or
manufacturer; and crashworthiness design litigation brought against
sellers and manufacturers.
152 Evidence of a seat belt restraint system is important in evaluating the
over-all safety design of the vehicle, which in turn is probative to the issue of
whether the vehicle was defective or unreasonably dangerous. See notes 174-85
infra and accompanying text. Evidence presented by a competent witness may
also establish that the injuries for which suit has been brought would have been
prevented or reduced in accordance with either affirmative defenses or as a
means to reduce damages consistent with established principles. See notes
187-212 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 174-97 infra and accompanying text.




In non-design cases, the seat belt defense may often be asserted in
the form of an allegation of contributory negligence or to support a
claim that there was an absence of proximate cause between the acci-
dent and the injuries sustained. In such cases courts have tended to re-
ject the defense or, alternatively, to treat it with great caution. This
cautious approach is not merited in terms of the value of seat belts, but
is somewhat supported by what is perceived to be a judicial reluctance
to permit a defense which would totally bar an apparently innocent
plaintiff from all recovery.
Two Ohio decisions illustrate this judicial caution. In Bertsch v.
Spears," it appears that plaintiff failed to wear an available seat belt
and sustained a fractured jaw caused by his impact with the vehicle in-
terior. Although no evidence was presented as to the effect a seat belt
would have had on preventing the injury, the court addressed the issue
and rejected the defense. Interestingly, the court noted that "[i]t may be
that in a future case the evidence introduced or proferred will indicate
that the failure to use a seat belt was a contributing factor in the occur-
rence of the accident or in producing or aggravating the plaintiff's in-
juries and that the issue should be submitted to the jury.""
The Bertsch opinion clearly indicates that evidence of failure to use a
seat belt, given a proper foundation, would be admissible in design
defect litigation and possibly in a pure negligence, personal injury ac-
tion.157 In Roberts v. Bohm,158 apparently ignoring this interpretation of
Bertsch, the court took a more restrictive position ruling without
qualification that the seat belt defense was not available. Roberts, like
Bertsch, was a pure negligence, personal injury action without design
defect ramifications.
An Illinois court took a more realistic approach in Kassella v.
Stonitsch,159 which also concerned a non-design defect negligence action.
During cross-examination of the plaintiff's orthopedic expert witness, it
was admitted that seat belt utilization would have reduced injury. Plain-
tiff claimed to have no recall of whether the available seat belt had been
in use. No further evidence on the issue was proferred and the trial
court correctly ruled that no seat belt instruction to the jury was
155 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194 (6th Dist. 1969).
Id. at 139, 252 N.E.2d at 196.
7 I& at 139, 252 N.E.2d at 196. This possibility was realized and applied by
the court in Newell v. Walker, No. 78 Civ. 0220 (Lake Cty. C.P. July, 1980) (giving
a seat belt charge to the jury in a crashworthiness action).
15 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (Lake Cty. 7th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom., Suchy v. Moore, 29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878
(1971).
159 57 Ill. App. 3d 817, 373 N.E.2d 608 (1978). See also Miller v. Haynes, 454
S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1965).
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necessary.16 The appellate court affirmed, observing that the seat belt
defense was not available as evidence of contributory negligence, but
was permissible on the question of damages, provided competent evi-
dence of a causal link between failure to wear the seat belt and the in-
juries sustained was introduced."' The opinion recognized that seat belt
evidence was relevant to the determination of the liability issues under
consideration. The appellate ruling was premised on an absence of suffi-
cient evidence and not the relevance of available evidence. 62
Bertsch, by implication, and Kassela, expressly, approved the seat
belt defense in non-design cases. Both, however, exhibit a cautious ap-
proach and do not permit speculation. Arguments in support of the
more restrictive view of Roberts cannot be logically or legally sus-
tained. In non-design cases, competent seat belt evidence should be ad-
missible and a proper jury instruction tendered, but only if adequately
supported by the evidence.
In design defect litigation, arguments against admission of evidence
in support of the seat belt defense are clearly without foundation."
Crashworthiness actions,' now recognized by the majority of courts
despite sound criticism," 5 present the single most compelling area for
recognition of the seat belt defense and admission of evidence in sup-
port thereof. In any design case, most poignantly a crashworthiness
design case, it is paradoxical for a court to rule that a manufacturer can
" See 57 Ill. App.3d at 820, 373 N.E.2d at 611.
" Id., 373 N.E.2d at 611.
112 See Id, 373 N.E.2d at 612.
' See Hagarty, Design Defects, Seat Belts and Second Injury, 24 FED. INS.
COUNSEL Q. 27 (1973); Robinson & Cullen, Federal Court Rules Virginia Law
Allows Evidence of Non-Use of Seat Belt, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 123 (1978); Sym-
posium-The Seat Belt Defense in Practice, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 172 (1970); Recent
Developments Spier v. Barker, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883 (1975).
Traditional design defect litigation is concerned with a design factor that
causes an injury producing occurrence similar to that caused by a manufacturing
defect. Differences between manufacturing defects and design choice defects are
detailed by many commentators. See Henderson, Design Defect Litigation
Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1976); Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturer's Concious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1513 (1973); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There
A Better Approach?, 8 SW. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher
and Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design
Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976).
'" "Crashworthiness" is the term given to describe a motor vehicle's capacity
to afford protection to a passenger against personal injury or death as a result of
a motor vehicle accident. See 15 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1976); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F.
Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978). See also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489
F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
" See Hoenig and Goetz, supra note 42; Hoenig and Werber, Automobile




be liable for the failure to design safety features into a product so as to
reduce the likelihood of an accident or the potential for "enhanced" or
"aggravated" injuries, while at the same time excluding evidence of a
design feature directed to the reduction of such potential. The anomoly
is heightened where a maintainable action can be brought if the seat
restraint system fails, thereby permitting otherwise avoidable injuries
to occur. 6
Design defect litigation is plagued by legally complex questions in-
cluding burden of proof, causation and the definitions of "defect,"
"unreasonably dangerous," or "enhanced injury." The definition of the
term "defect" has been debated without adequate resolution since the
inception of the strict tort liability doctrine.' 7 Despite inherent legal-
theoretical difficulties and technical issues, courts have recognized an
increasing variety of design cases.'68
Initial crashworthiness decisions followed a pure negligence theory of
liability as enunciated in Larsen v. General Motors Corp..'9 More recent
decisions have imposed crashworthiness liability under the doctrine of
strict tort liability,'7' or pursuant to a breach of warranty theory."'
'" See Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Enberg v. Ford
Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1974).
167 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Barker v.
Lull Engineering, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rtpr. 225 (1978); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Freedman, Defect in the
Product: The Necessry Basis for Products Liability in Tort and Warranty, 49 VA.
L. REV. 675 (1963); Hoenig, supra note 156; Keeton, Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973). Subsequent Oregon decisions il-
lustrate the continued difficulty faced by trial courts in defining a defect and its
relationship to foreseeability. See Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278
Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d
132 (1976). Similar problems are evident in many other jurisdictions.
I" For example, crashworthiness concepts have been extended to include
motorcycles which allegedly fail to protect against leg injuries sustained during a
collision. Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 370 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1979).
Even exterior vehicle design which could injure a pedestrian or a motorcyclist
can raise a jury issue. See Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App.3d 710, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1976) (pedestrian injured); Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (motorcyclist injured).
16 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). As noted in a 1977 Illinois decision, Buehler v.
Whalen, 70 Ill.2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1977), some twenty decisions from 1971 to
1977 accepted the crashworthiness doctrine under Larsen reasoning. These in-
clude: Steonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Jeng v.
Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305 (Colo.
App. 1978); Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d
339 (1978); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorvich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978).
17' See, e.g., Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 n.260 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Roberts
v. May, 583 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1978); Buehler v. Whalen, 60 Ill.2d 51, 374 N.E.2d
460 (1977).
'.. See, e.g., Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978) (amend-
ments to the Massachusetts Uniform Commercial Code make a cause of action for
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Thus, although the majority of states which have adopted crash-
worthiness as a valid cause of action have done so, and continue to do so,
under negligence principles, 7 ' negligence is not the sole theoretical
basis for recovery in this type of design-defect litigation. 17 3
Regardless of the underlying legal theory used in design defect ac-
tion, seat belt evidence is relevant if the court properly recognizes that
in such litigation, the product as a whole must be considered. The pro-
duct must be considered in connection with its design goals and should
only be compared to those products with similar design goals or
criteria.7 ' For example, a snub-nosed vehicle cannot be compared to a
standard passenger car in a front-end collision case'75 nor a convertible
to a hard-top vehicle in a roll-over case. 7 ' Similarly, an allegedly defec-
tive door latch cannot be considered without weighing other aspects of
the vehicle structure which may have compensated for the latch
design.'
The current trend of decisions reflects an acute awareness of these
appropriate parameters of design defect litigation. A leading decision
breach of warranty "as comprehensive as the strict liability theory of recovery");
Elsasser v. American Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978).
.72 See, e.g., Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1976); Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 370 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
1979); Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 553 P.2d 1306 (1976).
..' See notes 170-71 supra and accompanying text. The distinction between the
theories are blurred and a negligence overlay is discovered upon an analysis of
virtually any of the decisions. See, e.g., Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M. D.
Pa. 1978); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964 (Mass. 1978); Elasser v. American
Motors Corp., 81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978). The legal and practical
problems inherent in design defect litigation suggest that reform is needed.
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 541 (1976); Hoenig, Product Designs
and Strict Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 SW. U. L. REV. 109 (1976);
O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract- With or Without Enabling
Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 59 (1975); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler and Donaher,
Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425
(1974).
... This need is recognized in the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1392(f)(3) (1976), which provides that in presenting automobile safety
standards the Secretary of the Department of Transportation must "consider
whether any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and appropriate
for the particular type of motor vehicle ... " Id. This and similar legislation deal-
ing with installation of passive restraint systems support a staggered timetable
for the introduction of such systems by manufacturers dependent upon vehicle
size. See Fed. Motor Vehicle Safety Std. 208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S.4.1.2. (1980).
See also Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.
1978).
I" See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
17. See Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 198 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
17 See Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Jeng v. Witters,




properly applying Larsen crashworthiness principles is Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G.' 8 Implicit throughout this opinion is a belief that
the totality of the vehicle must be considered in determining whether
an alleged defect exists. The seat belt restraint system is within the am-
bit of such considerations.
It, perhaps, may not be amiss to note that there is not substan-
tial evidence to sustain a finding that as a result of the design of
the Microbus, the plaintiff's injuries were enhanced. In fact, the
records seem clear that in any event, plaintiff, who had made no
endeavor to protect herself with a seat belt, would have re-
ceived severe injuries, irrespective of the type of vehicle she
may have been riding in.
179
Had the court chosen, it could have readily qualified "Microbus" with
language to indicate front end structure and/or the absence of energy
absorbing devices. Instead the court referred to the vehicle as a whole
and recognized that the seat belt system was a component part of an
overall design."'
Shortly after the "whole vehicle" concept was implicitly recognized,
another federal court of appeals adopted it. In Melia v. Ford Motor
Co.,'8 ' the defendant contended that the district court judge failed to
properly instruct the jury that they should consider the vehicle as a
whole to determine whether the vehicle was defectively designed. The
court of appeals agreed that this was the appropriate standard, but
found that the trial court had so instructed the jury.'82 Evidence in
regard to seat belts was also permitted. A similar position was taken in
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,' 3 in which the court set forth
defendants' contentions and held that "[i]t is defendants' position that
the jury should give cognizance to the full design of the automobile, in-
cluding safety factors, when deciding whether the automobile was in
fact defective.' 84
A seat belt restraint system is an integral part of modern day motor
vehicle design. Its primary purpose is to provide a means of protecting
178 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). The plaintiff was a passenger in a Volkswagen
Microbus which struck a telephone pole resulting in a serious leg injury. The
plaintiff alleged that by minimizing the distance between the front end of the
vehicle and the passenger compartment to provide additional cargo or passenger
space the vehicle was without adequate "crush space" or sufficient devices to ab-
sorb the energy of frontal impacts. Id. at 1069.
179 Id at 1076.
1 Id. at 1072.
181 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
18 Id at 800.
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Id. at 1371 (emphasis in original). See also Caizzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.,
468 F. Supp. 593, 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 79-7419
(April 2, 1981).
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the vehicle occupant from injury or death in motor vehicle accidents
which are equally foreseeable by the manufacturer and occupant.
Judges in design defect litigation should take into account the totality of
the vehicle and view the product in this light. This principle should apply
in negligence, strict tort liability and warranty actions with equal per-
suasiveness.
The presence of a seat belt restraint system is a factor which should
be considered by the jury even in the absence of evidence establishing
the effects of its use in the specific circumstances of a litigated accident.
Evidence of the general benefits attained through seat belt use, or
judicial notice of this fact, is adequate to support a jury instruction
directing that the seat belt restraint system be considered when
weighing the defect allegations. This principle is particularly applicable
when the action is one in which the plaintiff seeks recovery for en-
hanced or aggravated injuries under the crashworthiness theory. It also
applies in general design defect litigation. In both situations, a threshold
question is the existence of a design defect. The presence of a seat belt
is evidence of a probative fact tending to establish that the overal vehi-
cle design was not defective in regard to its safety potential.
In a crashworthiness case, it is essential that the court permit
evidence of the actual benefits which seat belt use would have provided.
Under any underlying theory, the evidence is probative of the primary
factual issue; i.e., to what extent did the vehicle design enhance in-
juries? Conversely, the evidence is also probative to address the issue of
to what extent did the vehicle design have the capacity to prevent in-
juries? Liability can be properly imposed only after both aspects of the
issue are sent to the jury for evaluation. If a product's general design is
relevant to questions of injury causation, that same design is, afortiori,
relevant to questions of injury prevention. Any other conclusion is
untenable. The question truly before the courts is not the probative
value of seat belt evidence,185 but the legal issues to which such evidence
may be properly directed.
The existence of a seat belt should always be viewed as relevant to
the determination of vehicle design defect. Its existence can permit a
jury to find that there was no defect, that the product was not
unreasonably dangerous, that it was not negligently designed or that it
was fit for its intended purpose and use.'88 This is true regardless of the
' No case has been found that precluded seat belt evidence on the grounds of
probative value.
188 Similarly, seat structure, method of vehicle construction, utilization of
energy absorbing steering columns, steering wheel and dashboard design, special
window glass and other "designed in" safety features would seem to be properly
admissible to establish that the overall vehicle was not designed defectively and





actual effect seat belt usage would have had in the particular cir-
cumstances of an accident. Some injuries are simply not avoidable and
their occurrence does not establish fault or liability on the part of the
seller or manufacturer of the vehicle. When the evidence is offered to
establish that specific injuries would not have been sustained, expert
testimony must be presented to establish this as a probable fact beyond
mere speculation.'87 In this context, seat belt evidence is relevant (in-
dependent of plaintiff's negligence) to show: 1) that the product was not
defective; 2) that affirmative defenses such as assumption of the risk
and misuse are viable; and 3) that the measure of damages should be
modified.
C. Legal Basis For Admission of Seat Belt Evidence
I. Assumption of the Risk-Misuse
Failure to use a seat belt may operate as a complete bar to recovery
by plaintiffs despite judicial reluctance to openly recognize this
possibility.'88 Non-use of an available seat belt can constitute a misuse of
the vehicle sufficient to be categorized as an assumption of the risk. It is
generally recognized that the voluntary assumption of a known risk is a
complete defense to an action based on strict tort liability as well as
common law negligence.' 9
In Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 9' the Eighth Circuit, in accordance with
Nebraska's strict tort liability doctrine, affirmed a jury instruction
which specified: "the defenses of assumption of the risk or misuse of the
product are separate from negligence or contributory negligence and,
therefore, you are to consider the defenses of assumption of the risk or
misuse of the product.''. Under this instruction both misuse and
assumption would constitute complete defenses. If the jury found that
187 See Kassela v. Stonitsch, 57 Ill. App. 2d 817, 373 N.E.2d 608 (1978); Austin
v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
1" See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967) (uniform rejection of seat
belt evidence as negligence per se or contributory negligence as a complete bar
to recovery). For at least fifteen years, commentators have suggested that seat
belt non-use need not act as a complete bar, unless all relevant injuries would
have been prevented. See Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense: An Exercise in
Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 620 (1967); Note, Automobile Seat Belts: Protec-
tion for Defendants As Well As Motorists, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 732, 739 (1965);
Note, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence 12 S.D.L. REV. 130 (1967).
"' See Bowman, Practical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyer's View, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 191 (1970); Hagarty, supra note 163; Hoglund & Parsons, Caveat
Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50
Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1974); Comment, The Seat Belt Defense: A New Approach, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 94, 95-96 (1969-70); Recent Developments, supra note 163, at 886
n.15.
534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
'1 Id. at 802.
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plaintiff misused the product, or assumed the risk of injury or enhanced
injury (by failing to wear the available seat belt) recovery could be bar-
red.192 A similar instruction characterizing the failure of plaintiff to wear
an available seat belt as a misuse of the product was approved in
General Motors Corp. v. Walden.'93 The question of whether failure to
use an available seat belt constitutes a misuse of the product in a strict
tort liability action against a manufacturer or seller is usually regarded
as a factual issue.1 9 A better approach may be to treat the question as
one of law. ' 95
The applicability of the doctrine of assumption of risk to the seat belt
defense may be viewed from two perspectives. One approach is to ex-
amine the specific risk of being hurt or injured more severely as a con-
sequence of non-use of an available seat belt during an injury-causing ac-
cident. This view has troubled some commentators because of their fre-
quent unwillingness either to interfere with an automobile occupant's
"freedom of choice" not to use seat belts 9 ' or to impose upon motorists
19 Id at 801. The reasoning for this result, typical of jurisdictions which have
adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was premised upon
comment n to that section. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment n (1965).
193 406 F.2d 606, 609 (10th Cir. 1969).
19 See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); General
Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1969). Even where a passenger
was injured in a crashworthiness design-defect case while wearing only a lap belt
(the vehicle had a shoulder harness), the question of whether the failure to use
the available harness was held to be a jury question. Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d
305 (Colo. App. 1978).
The Roberts court stated:
The crucial question under the misuse defense is whether "misuse by
the injured party [was] not reasonably anticipated by the manufacturer."
Here, assuming that plaintiffs failure to wear the shoulder restraint was
a "misuse," the question of whether defendant should have foreseen that
misuse is a question for the trier of fact. Similarly, assuming plaintiff
was aware of the risk she was running by using only the lap belt, the
question of whether her voluntary choice in accepting that risk was
unreasonable is also a question which should be left to the jury.
Id. at 309.
1 Compare, Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d at 308-09. See also notes 253-76 infra
and accompanying text.
'" Although the "freedom of choice" argument has been advanced from time
to time, see, e.g., Kleist, supra note 188, it is not sound:
There are two answers to this argument. First, the standard of care in
negligence has always been an objective one. Thus it should not matter
that the plaintiff held an honest belief that seat belts are dangerous,
that the plaintiff had never seen a seat belt, or that the plaintiff never
gave any thought to wearing a belt. What the plaintiffs subjective view
of the situation is, or what he thinks or believes is good for himself at
the time, cannot have any effect on the reasonable person standard




an obligation to anticipate accidents. 97 Such reluctance has been prop-
erly criticized as inconsistent with the duty of foreseeability imposed
upon manufacturers through the crashworthiness doctrine'98 and also
with other aspects of tort law which impose upon an actor various
obligations to take precautions against dangers that are cognizable and
somewhat predictable.'"
Efforts to focus upon that part of the doctrine of assumption of risk
which requires the anticipation and acceptance of a known danger2 ° are
unconvincing. Some of the confusion derives from an imprecise defini-
tion of the risks assumed in the non-use of an available seat belt. Thus,
if the plaintiff insists on the freedom to act according to his personal
views or comfort, he cannot then expect the defendant to bear the loss
that results when his decision turn out to be the wrong one.
Slatter, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 96 100-01
(1977-78). See also O'Donnell, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem
of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1051 (1979);
Comment, Occupant Protection, supra note 6.
" See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161, 163 (1974); Rem-
ington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 291, 159 A.2d 145, 146 (1969); Jurgensen v.
Schirmer Transp. Co., 242 Minn. 157, 64 N.W.2d 530 (1954); Roberts v. Bohm, 26
Ohio App. 2d 50, 58, 269 N.E.2d 53, 59 (1971); Fields v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Kleist, supra note 188, at 621.
'" See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). Larsen
and its progeny have held that while automobiles are not intended to collide with
other vehicles such collisions are foreseeable. Automobile manufacturers have a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of their vehicles to minimize injury
as much as possible in those foreseeable accidents. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin,
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976);
Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1976); Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co.,
494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.
1972); Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972);
Grundamis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Brandenberger v.
Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Bolm v. Triumph Corp.,
33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
9 See notes 200-13 infra and accompanying text.
Dean Prosser's discussion of the doctrine of assumption of the risk
describes three instances in which the doctrine arises, each of which involves
some level of knowledge on the part of the actor:
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means that the
plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an
obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chance of injury from a
known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone ....
A second ... situation, where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into some
relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not
protect him against the risk ....
In the third type of situation the plaintiff, aware of a risk already
created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily to en-
counter it....
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 440 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
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for example, in Melia,"° after discussing the "known danger" aspect of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' explanation of the doctrine of
assumption of risk,0 2 the appellate court decided that there was no
assumption of risk. 3 It did so because it found the plaintiff did not in-
tend to encounter the other driver's failure to observe a red light, ignor-
ing the fact that the plaintiffs non-use of a seat belt, in itself, could have
been an assumption of risk.0' The argument that a plaintiff alleging
design defects should not be deemed to have assumed a risk of enhanced
injuries resulting from failure to use a seat belt misses the point as to
the risk assumed. It is not the awareness of a risk of a specific defect as
to which the risk of injury is alone assumed, but rather the risk of in-
jury from the myriad of causes of automobile accidents which endanger
the plaintiff's safety.
By definition, a "known" risk of future injury is merely a future
danger with a substantial degree of foreseeability.2 05 Conceptually, a
danger which is foreseeable falls entirely within the Restatement's
definition of being one which is "known," provided the probability of its
occurrence is high enough or the magnitude of its consequences is great
enough. 06 The doctrine of crashworthiness is premised upon a judicial
201 Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976). In Melia, the court's
consideration of assumption of risk focused upon the conduct of having failed to
use the available seat belt. It was held that "[t]he trial court instructed that if the
jury found that in failing to wear the seat belt or lock the door, the decedent
misused the product or assumed the risk of injury, recovery would be barred.
The jury was properly allowed to pass on these issues." Id at 799. Nevertheless,
when the court discussed the "known dangers" aspect of the assumption doctrine
contained in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it did so only in
the context of the claim that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for having
entered the intersection on a red light. Thus, it was in response to the defense of
contributory negligence, not assumption of the risk, that the court held: "Clearly,
there is no evidence that the decedent's alleged conduct of entering an intersec-
tion on a red light was intentional rather than inadvertent. The defense of
assumption of risk under Nebraska law 'applies to known dangers and not to
those things from which, in possibility, danger may flow'. Id at 801 (em-
phasis in original).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
202 534 F.2d at 801.
24 Id
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D comment b (1965).
2 Learned Hand's formula for determining when a duty exists to take precau-
tions against damages has often been recited as a sound basis for dealing with
this question. In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947), Judge
Hand stated that liability depends upon whether the probability of harm
multiplied by the severity of damage outweighs the burden of taking adequate
precautions against the occurrence. Id. at 173. Dean Prosser's test is similar. See
W. PROSSER, supra note 200, at 419.
Given such criteria, which are reasonable and logical in the context of the




determination that automobile drivers will have accidents and that
manufacturers must anticipate the occurrence of those collisions °7 In
recent years with media safety campaigns-billboards and publications
stressing the value of "buckling up" -the "reasonable man" cannot fair-
ly be said to be unaware that seat belts prevent injuries and save
lives." 8 The hazards of highway travel are a fact of American life, so ob-
vious to all that there can be no question that accidents in general are
foreseeable, although a particular accident may not be." 9 It is hardly
unreasonable to permit evidence of non-use of an available seat belt to
support a defense of assumption of risk, especially in a crashworthiness
design case.
The second approach to the admissibility of seat belt evidence based
on the assumption of the risk doctrine concerns the substance of the
crashworthiness design liability theory. In determining whether a
manufacturer's design was the proximate cause of enhanced injuries,
courts have held that it is the total vehicle which must be considered,
not just the allegedly defective component. ° In considering the whole
vehicle, the courts have deemed the determinative factor in the
crashworthiness evaluation to be the adequacy of the overall design,"
201-05 supra, the safest ground for the courts would be to adopt a position that
the great risk of serious injury, combined with the frequency of serious accidents
would make non-use of an available seat belt "reasonable" only in the most
unusual situations. See Comment, The Failure to Use Seat Belts as a Basis for
Establishing Contributory Negligence, Barring Recovery for Personal Defense
Problems-The Expert's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 203 (1970). See also Miller,
Crashworthiness of Automobiles, SCIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1973, at 81; accord, Spier
v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168 (1974).
1 The initial reaction to Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968), was often one of concern that the court was attempting to equate
foreseeability with duty. See, e.g., Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 42, at 22. More
recently, however, the test has been clarified as being whether the manufacturer
created an unreasonable risk of harm in the event the foreseeable collision occur-
red, not whether injury was foreseeable in such event. See Green, Foreseeability
in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1961).
Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 189, at 13.
Hagarty, supra note 163, at 27.
210 See notes 174-85 supra and accompanying text. This is also true from a
purely technical approach. See Trinca, Medical Aspects of Seat Belt Usage, in
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26.
21 See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Dreisentok
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978). As the court stated in Melia:
No doubt the manufacturers of automobiles could design and build an
automobile with the strength and crash-damage resistance features of an
M-2 army tank. I believe the average and reasonable automobile user
desires only a reasonably safe, economical form of motor transportation.
No greater burden of design-performance ought to be imposed upon
automobile manufacturers by either judge or jury.
534 F.2d at 805.
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but courts have not always seized upon the correlative perspective of
the vehicle user. As a question of assumption of the risk, evidence of the
non-use of an available seat belt should be admissible to prove that the
occupant assumed a risk of enhanced injury from the intentional and
voluntary failure to utilize an important safety feature of that total
vehicle design-the seat belt. In the context of the assumption of the
risk doctrine, the fact that a seat belt provides far less protection when
sat upon than when properly affixed is "known." Its non-use thereby
constitutes a use of the total vehicle in a condition which is less protec-
tive of the occupant as a whole than when the seat belt is properly
worn. There is no logical reason to apply a different definition of
"unreasonably dangerous" when referring to a vehicle's crashwor-
thiness as opposed to referring to the conduct of an occupant who, by
forsaking an available seat belt, assumes the risk that a subsequent acci-
dent will result in enhanced injuries."'
The concepts of knowledge inherent in the assumption doctrine and
foreseeability incorporated into the crashworthiness doctrine are not
logically distinguishable. Any such distinction is at best one of degree of
certainty, not kind. It is the clear foreseeability of injury causing ac-
cidents which leads to the invocation of the doctrine of assumption of
the risk. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS recognizes in its discus-
sion of assumption of the risk that a passenger can be barred from any
recovery because of the foreseeability of an injury-causing collision on
the highways and "suggests that the hazards of a collision are so well
known and recognized that they compel a person's course of conduct to
avoid even risking those dangers.""21
II. Proximate Cause
The otherwise clear distinction between liability defenses, (assump-
tion of the risk), and damage-quantification issues, (mitigation of
damages, avoidable consequences and comparative fault), becomes blur-
red at the conceptual barrier of proximate cause. Under any theory of
212 As exemplified in Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968), some
courts have improperly rejected seat belt evidence because of their perception of
statistics establishing that only a minority of automobile occupants utilize
available seat belts. The "average motorist" referred to in Miller embodies an
evaluation of actual persons which is inconsistent with the law's hypothetical
reasonable man standard. The appropriate legal standard is the reasonable man,
not the average man. If the reasonable man would utilize an available seat belt,
then the average man's failure to do so is negligent conduct. "Neglect of duty
does not cease by repetition to be neglect of duty." Bank of Montreal v. Dominion
Guarantee Co., [1930] A.C. 659, 666, (Lord Tomlin), cited in Comment, Torts - Seat
Belts - Contributory Negligence - Position of English Courts, 53 CANADIAN B.
REV. 113, 119 (1975). See notes 253-65 infra and accompanying text for further
discussion of the reasonable man standard.




liability, be it traditional negligence, breach of warranty or strict liabili-
ty, the plaintiff can only recover for those damages which are proven to
have been proximately caused by the allegedly wrongful conduct of the
defendant.21 ' Whether the evidence in a given case demonstrates that
only some of the injuries were proximately caused by the failure to use
an available seat belt, or that all of the injuries could have been avoided
by such use may be as a practical matter, all that characterizes the issue
as one of damages or liability. A defendant is simply not liable for
damages which were not proximately caused by his conduct, regardless
of the underlying cause of action.
If the non-use of an available seat belt can be proven by competent
evidence to have been the proximate cause or an aggravating cause of
the plaintiffs injuries, recovery for the injuries so caused or aggravated
should be barred. 15 Proximate cause should be measured, at least in a
strict liability action and other matters wherein the RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS applies, by the substantial factor test ie., whether the
failure to wear the available seat belt was a substantial factor in causing
injury. '6 The burden of proof on this particular application of the con-
cept of proximate cause necessarily rests with the defendant. 7 In
Truman v. Vargas,"8 the appellate court implicitly approved the trial
court's determination that the jury could properly consider expert
testimony which was directed to the question of whether non-use of the
available seat belt caused all or some of the plaintiffs injuries. The
court of appeals held:
Upon a retrial the court or jury will determine whether in the
exercise of ordinary care Truman should have used the seat
belt; expert testimony will be required to prove whether
Truman would have been injured, and, if so, the extent of the in-
214 PROSSER, supra note 200 at 236.
215 In Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaner's & Shirt Launderers, Inc., 53 N.J. 157, 249
A.2d 382 (1969), an analogy to the seat belt defense was used to reject the affirm-
ative defense of contributory negligence because of the absence of competent
evidence to prove that the plaintiff was more severely injured due to her failure
to be seated. Id at 385. See also General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606,
(10th Cir. 1969); Pritts v. Walter Lowrey Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). Comment a provides:
In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the
harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent.... The
negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plain-
tiffs harm. The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the
defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead
reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular
sense....
217 See, e.g., Truman v. Vargas, 274 Cal. App.2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1960).
218 274 Cal. App.2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1960).
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juries he would have sustained if he had been using the seat
belt; the burden of going forward upon this issue will be upon
the defendant. 19
The importance of the proximate cause requirement is particularly
clear in crashworthiness cases where liability is premised upon a claim
that injuries sustained in an accident were enhanced because of a design
defect in the vehicle. The natural and unavoidable corollary of this re-
quirement is that no defendant in such a case will be held liable for in-
juries which would have occurred absent the alleged design or manufac-
turing defect. "[T]he manufacturer should be liable for that portion of
the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the
damage or injury caused that probably would have occurred as a result
of the impact or collision absent the defective design." '
The traditional "but for" test associated with questions of proximate
causation is one for the trier of fact to resolve."1 The trier cannot be ex-
pected to fairly determine whether all or some injuries were proxi-
mately caused by the vehicle design unless evidence of the failure to use
the available seat belt and the consequences thereof is admissible.
III. Mitigation of Damages and Avoidable Consequences
In an increasing number of jurisdictions, evidence of non-use of an
available seat belt has been admitted for purposes of allowing juries to
determine whether to diminish recoverable damages because of an ade-
quate showing of a causal connection between such non-use and all or
some of the injuries sustained. 2
Admission of seat belt evidence to mitigate damages is based upon
the requirement that the failure to use the available restraint is "a
219 Id. at 980-81, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78.
Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 522-23 (Tenn. 1973).
The question of whether the failure to utilize the seat belt is a "but for"
cause of the injuries sustained has always been within the province of the fact-
finder rather than for legislatures to determine. It must be considered in each
case upon the facts made available to the trier of fact.
' E.g., Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying
Indiana law); Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Josel v. Rossi,
7 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 288 N.E.2d 677 (1972); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323
N.E.2d 164 (1974); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); See generally
authorities collected in, Annot. 80 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1977).
The recent trend, especially in crashworthiness cases, establishes the ad-
missibility of seat belt non-use. See Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th
Cir. 1976); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.
1978); Daly v. GMC, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); Roberts v. May, 583
P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1978); Kassella v. Stonitsch, 57 Ill. App. 2d 817, 373 N.E.2d
608 (1978); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974). Over twenty





substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm which ensues.' ' 2 3
Courts and commentators have had some difficulty applying this doc-
trine, whether termed "mitigation of damages" or "avoidable conse-
quences," 4 partially because the culpable act of failing to use the
available seat belt occurs prior to the injury-causing collision. 5 Others,
including Dean Prosser, have referred to the use of this theory of
damage reduction, especially in crashworthiness cases, as "the better
view unless we are to place an entirely artificial emphasis upon the mo-
ment of impact .... 221 The Restatement (Second) of Torts also approves
apportionment of damages for a plaintiff's antecedent negligence.2 7
A second judicial statement of the use of the seat belt defense for
reducing recoverable damages, especially in a crashworthiness case,
was made in Wilson v. Volkswagen of America.21 8 After rejecting
evidence of the non-use of a seat belt as a complete bar to recovery, the
court specifically allowed evidence to be presented as to whether
Wilson's injuries, allegedly "enhanced" by the design defect of the
defendant's vehicle, would have been less severe had Wilson used the
available seat belt.229 The burden of proving, by competent expert
testimony, the effect that seat belt use would have had in reducing or
eliminating the specific injuries was placed squarely upon the defend-
ant. Once sufficient evidence has been presented to allow the issue to
reach the jury, the court succinctly set forth the role that such non-use
evidence would play:
The failure by plaintiff to wear a seat belt, even if unreasonable,
is not in and of itself a bar to his recovery. However, if you find
Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273, 276 (1967). The
Barry opinion explained the distinction between traditional mitigation of
damages, and "antecedent negligence" which may be found in seat belt cases
when the defendant seeks mitigation of damages. Based on the record, the court
found no evidence to establish that the plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt
resulted in increased injuries. Thus, the court was able to resolve the legal issues
it had raised on the narrow ground of inadequate facts to support the defense. On
the broader issue of the availability of this defense, the court specifically refrained
from taking a position since the evidence did not require that it do so. It appears
that had proper evidence been proffered, the court would have admitted it in
relation to the damages question.
" See, e.g., McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Romankewicz
v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 217, 184 N.W.2d 367 (1970); Kjellman v. Richards, 82
Wash.2d 766, 514 P.2d 134 (1973); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash.2d 161, 492
P.2d 1030 (1972).
'2 See W. PROSSER, supra note 200, at 422-24; J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND
RECOVERY 215-18 (1972); Robinson and Cullen, supra note 157, at 127.
' W. PROSSER, supra note 200, at 423-24.
2' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 465, comment c (1965).
445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978).
Id at 1372-73.
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that it was unreasonable for the plaintiff not to use a seat belt,
and that he would not have received some or all of his injuries
had he used the seat belt, then you may not award any damages
for those injuries you find he would not have received had he
used the seat belt. The burden of proving that it was
unreasonable not to use the seat belt rests upon the defendant,
as does the burden of proving that some or all of plaintiff's in-
juries would not have been received had he used the seat belt.30
The decision in Spier v. Barker,2 3 1 on which Wilson and other cases
permitting the seat belt defense on the question of damages have fre-
quently relied, presents a full and clear development of the concept by
which a plaintiffs antecedent conduct justifies a jury's reduction of
recoverable damages. While rejecting defense efforts to advance
theories based upon a claim that non-use constituted negligence per se 
32
or contributory negligence," s the court of appeals held that the non-use
of an available seat belt is a factor the jury can consider in determining
whether the plaintiff has exercised due care in avoiding or mitigating in-
jury.23
Despite formal, traditional application of the doctrines of mitigation
and avoidable consequences to post-accident events, the admissibility of
evidence of seat belt non-use is peculiarly appropriate where, as the
Spier court noted, "the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an
unusual and ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may
minimize his or her damages prior to the accident""'' and "there can be
no doubt whatsoever as to the efficacy of the automobile seat belt in
I I& at 1373.
21 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974).
2u The rationale of non-use of an available seat belt as negligence per se has
been consistently rejected, usually upon the grounds that applicable statutes
mandating installation of seat belts do not also mandate their use. See, e.g., Rem-
ington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969); Cierpisz v. Singleton,
247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Romankewicz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167
N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v.
Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.2d 362, 149
N.W.2d 626 (1967).
Although negligence per se has been rejected uniformly in the United States,
it has won judicial approval in England, where the courts have adopted the
posture that the risk of driving without a restraint is always an unreasonable one
and as a consequence, it is always negligence to fail to use an available seat belt.
Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 2, [19751 3 All E.R. 520 (C.A.).
211 The court restricted the availability of common law contributory
negligence as an affirmative defense to those situations where the negligence
caused the accident itself rather than simply enhancing the injuries. 35 N.Y.2d at
451, 323 N.E.2d at 168.
Id at 449-50, 323 N.E.2d at 167.




preventing injuries.""2 ' The interplay of such considerations with prin-
ciples applied in crashworthiness cases measuring manufacturers'
responsibilities, is such as to require as a matter of logic and equity,
that evidence of non-use be admitted. Since the manufacturer "is under
a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of col-
lision," '237 it is no less proper for a court to permit a jury to determine
"whether the plaintif has exercised ordinary care, not only to avoid in-
jury to himself, but to mitigate any injury he would likely sustain.""23 In
this context it makes no substantive difference whether the jury's con-
sideration of non-use be designated as mitigation or as avoidable conse-
quences .. .the doctrines are virtually identical.1
39
VII. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Not surprisingly, the seat belt defense has had its greatest accep-
tance in those jurisdictions which have adopted principles of com-
parative negligence. The Wisconsin case of Bentzler v. Braun,24 gener-
ally credited with being the earliest major judicial approval of the seat
belt defense, arose in a comparative negligence jurisdiction. The logic of
admitting evidence of non-use as one factor in a comprehensive jury
evaluation of all the elements of fault in an accident is clear," 1 especially
considering the need for refocusing the "reasonable man" standard in
the seat belt context.242 Whether the growth of comparative negligence
statutes "will ineluctably lead to the adoption of the seat belt rule as a
significant element of the damage apportionment equation"4 " may be
Id, 323 N.E.2d at 168. See also Frozzitta v. Incorporated Village of
Freeport, 57 A.D.2d 827, 394 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1977); Uribe v. Armstrong Rubber &
Tire Co., Inc., 55 A.D.2d 869, 390 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1977).
= Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
2 Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d at 450, 323 N.W.2d at 167. See also Mount v. Mc-
Clellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968).
' Decisions frequently acknowledge this fact by combining reference to the
two doctrines in the same statements. See, e.g., Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974). In Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468
F. Supp. 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the court stated: "The failure to use the seat belts
was properly considered in mitigation of the damages ... on the familiar princi-
ple that a tortfeaser is liable for the proximate but not for the avoidable conse-
quences of his tort." Id. at 606.
2 34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
241 Since the adoption of comparative negligence in England, the enabling
statute has provided that a finding of contributory negligence will not defeat a
claim but will merely cause its equitable apportionment. The Law Reform (Con-
tributory Negligence) Act of 1945, (8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28). See also, note 245 infra
and accompanying text.
212 See notes 253-66 infra and accompanying text.
" Hoglund and Parsons, supra note 189, at 14-15.
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open to argument, but the clearly discernable trend is toward such
adoption. " Whether the application of the seat belt defense in com-
parative negligence cases will ultimately lead to decisions which appor-
tion damages for failure to use an available belt also remains to be seen.
Early English experience with the question suggests that extreme
results will arise only in the unusual case where the expert testimony
overwhelmingly establishes that the use of the seat belt would have
prevented virtually all of the injuries sustained. 25 The consequences of
the adoption of the seat belt defense may also depend significantly upon
whether the form of comparative negligence in force in a given jurisdic-
tion is "pure" or "modified." In pure comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions, each party may recover for the negligence of the other, regardless
of the percentages of relative fault. In modified comparative negligence
jurisdictions, a claimant may be barred from any recovery if found to be
more than fifty percent at fault. 46 The relationship of comparative fault
principles and strict tort liability principles has not yet been fully ap-
preciated .247
24" See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska
law); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978);
Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, (Colo. App. 1978); Speir v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149
N.W.2d 626 (1967).
245 See, e.g., Pasternak v. Poulton, [1973] 1 W.L.R. (Q.B.). In Pasternak, the
plaintiff passenger did not wear an available seat belt which she did not know
was present. She was assessed only a 5% responsibility for having failed to use
the seat belt. In Toperoff v. Mor [1973] R.T.R. 419, reported in Kerse, Some Re-
cent Decisions on Wearing Seat Belts, 117 SOL. J. 625 (1973), the plaintiff was
charged with a reduction in damages of 25% when, after having been asked to
wear the seat belt and having done so prior to a brief stop following which it was
not reaffixed, the plaintiff was injured. The defendant driver had reaffixed the
seat belt and had not been seriously injured. See, also McGhee v. Frances Shaw
& Co., Ltd. [19731 R.T.R. 409 (331/30 mitigation); Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R.
414 (20% mitigation).
26 For an example of "pure" comparative negligence, see WASH. REV. CODE §§
4.44.010, .900, .910 (Supp. 1973), and for a "modified" form, see WIs. STAT. ANN. §
331.045 (West 1958). A majority of states have now adopted comparative fault
statutes, the most recent appears to be OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.19 (Page 1980). At
least three states have adopted comparative fault through judicial action. See Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.2d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoff-
man v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405
Mich. 638 (1979).
27 The court in Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976), failed to
fully grasp this issue when it declared:
We additionally observe the application of Nebraska's comparative
negligence statute would, under the language of the statute, be extremely
confusing and inappropriate in a strict liability case. Under Nebraska
law in order for the comparative negligence statute to be invoked the
plaintiff's negligence must be slight and the defendant's negligence
gross in comparison .. . In strict liability cases proof of negligence or
[Vol. 29:217
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss2/4
SEAT BEL T ISSUES
It may also be observed that in those cases where the seat belt
defense has been admitted as part of a comparative fault analysis,
courts have not been troubled by the canard frequently used by op-
ponents of the seat belt defense, ie., that a jury would have to engage in
too much speculation to determine the extent of injuries which the use
of an available seat belt would have prevented or reduced." ' The reduc-
tion of injuries resulting from use of a seat belt is certainly no more
speculative than is the enhancement of injuries from an alleged design
defect, especially where an allegedly defective-designed seat belt is the
mechanism of injury.249
With the advances in recent years in the fields of accident reconstruc-
tion and biomechanics, apportionment of damages via the seat belt
defense can no longer properly be claimed to be speculative. In a concur-
ring opinion in Amend v. Bell,250 Washington Supreme Court Justice
Dolliver took issue with the majority's claim that allowance of the seat
belt defense would require an unacceptable "battle of experts" and
would involve jury speculation as to damage apportionment.
The spectre raised by the majority as to "a veritable battle of
experts" is just that: a ghostly apparition with no substance.
Surely the testimony of experts on seat belts would cause no
more "substantial speculation by the trier of facts" than
numerous other factual issues which are routinely addressed. 51
The issues raised by this defense are no more complex or speculative
than other issues to which juries are routinely submitted. The founda-
tion of comparative fault concepts rests on the premise that juries,
when provided with adequate evidence, are capable of properly
apportioning fault.
degree of fault is not required...
Id. at 802 (citations omitted). Contra, Daly v. General Motors Corp., 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978) (applying comparative fault to a strict liability
action and, thereby placing the concepts into a proper perspective).
24 See, e.g., Kleist, supra note 188, at 619. Such arguments are substantially
weakened, of course, by the further development in the years since 1967 of ir-
refutable evidence of the value of seat belts in saving lives and reducing serious
injuries. See notes 64-80 supra and accompanying text.
29 In Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 (1979), the
plaintiff was permitted to plead and prove, and the jury was held to have been
justified in finding, that the injury to plaintiff was five times as severe as it
would have been, had the seat belt not been defective. No logic can justify a con-
tention that a jury is competent to determine that injuries are enhanced by a fac-
tor of five if a seat belt does not work but is not competent, because it would
engage in speculation, to determine that injuries would have been reduced by
that same factor of five if the available seat belt had in fact been used.
80 Wash.2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
2 Id at 135, 570 P.2d at 144.
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VII. OBSERVATIONS: THE REASONABLE PERSON -JUDICIAL NOTICE
When this article was conceived, no consideration was given to pre-
senting a discussion of the respective roles of judge and jury. As the ar-
ticle developed, two questions continuously intruded: what is a
reasonable person, and could judicial notice be of assistance in design-
defect seat belt litigation? The tentative answers to these questions
suggest that they be considered in conjunction with the related question
of what constitutes a proper jury charge. Although the responses can-
not be fully presented herein, some initial buoys may help future pilots
in these relatively uncharted waters. '
The reasonably prudent person has been with us for generations. Its
fictional ancestry and position in the law are without peer. Any review
of design-defect litigation opinions discloses consistent reference to both
the "reasonable man" and reasonableness standards. In seat belt
defense cases, the issue is more specific-would a reasonably prudent
person wear an available seat belt? In almost all cases permitting the
seat belt defense, this question has been treated as a question of fact for
the jury.53
It appears that this question should not be treated as a factual issue.
There is no factual issue. The evidence of seat belt efficacy is over-
whelming2" and the average person clearly comprehends that seat belts
prevent or reduce accident related injuries.255 In light of these facts, the
court should instruct the jury that a reasonably prudent person would
wear a seat belt. The instruction should be followed by other instruc-
tions detailing the limited effect the jury should give to this fact and
legal conclusion. 5 Of course, the jury should also be instructed that
they cannot ordinarily find for the defendant simply because the plain-
tiff failed to wear an available belt, but that they may do so only if that
failure was the proximate cause of the total injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. Additional limiting charges, dependent upon the legal theory
under which the seat belt defense was presented, might also be
Although both the reasonable man concept and the principle of judicial
notice are well known, neither appears to have been considered in the context sug-
gested.
' See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Wilson v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978).
See notes 64-80 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 108-19 supra and accompanying text. As noted therein, almost
90% of licensed drivers believe that seat belts prevent injury in motor vehicle ac-
cidents. In some instances, a plaintiff can be made to admit such knowledge.
' For discussion purposes, it is assumed that sufficient competent evidence of
injury prevention or reduction in the specific circumstances has been introduced.
Absent such evidence the seat belt defense could not be raised. Utilization of the
existence of a seat belt restraint system as some evidence that the vehicle was





proper. 57 In any event, the jury would commence its deliberations with
an understanding that the plaintiff in this respect, failed to meet the
"reasonable man" standard of conduct.
Precisely such an approach was taken by a trial court judge in a non-
crashworthiness case.258 The trial court instructed the jury:
Now, as to any mitigation of damages, you are instructed that it
is not negligence on the part of Mr. Thomas to not wear a seat
belt. By reason of the fact that he didn't wear one doesn't mean
that he was negligent.
However, if you determine under all the credible evidence and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in this case that Mr.
Thomas' failure to wear a seat belt substantially contributed to
the injuries and damages alleged to have been sustained by him
or that any portion thereof could have been avoided by the use
of the seat belt, then you may deduct from any amount that you
may make any amount for the injuries and damages which you
find could have been so avoided.259
To justify such a jury instruction, the court will have to place non-use
of seat belts into perspective. The majority of Americans, perhaps as
many as eighty-six percent, habitually fail to use available seat belts."
Some will argue that if this many Americans act in a specified way,
their conduct is automatically reasonable. The common law has con-
sistently rejected such an argument. For over seventy-five years, the
common law has applied the principle that prudent reasonable conduct
is measured by what persons should do, as distinct from what persons
actually do.26' A federal court of appeals recently addressed the question
in a decision dealing with an action brought pursuant to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act. 62 The court held:
The "reasonable man" is, of course, a fictional character bor-
rowed from tort law wherein his conduct sets the standard
=" One such limitation might be to frame the instruction in "conditional" terms
which create a presumption e.g., "[Ulnless the plaintiff has provided a valid reason
for non-use of the available seat belt, you are to find that plaintiffs failure to do
so was unreasonable." Valid reasons could include physical (medical) factors or
other circumstances such as are described in seat belt use statutes, e.g., P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 1212(b) (1976). Reasonableness considerations should not in-
clude the length of the trip, type of road, discomfort or fear of entrapment.
' Thomas v. Grant, No. 38422 (8th Dist. Ohio Ct. App., May 17, 1979) (un-
published journal entry and opinion).
Id. at 4.
See note 62 supra.
I See Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). See
also, Thompson v. Ohio Fuel & Gas Co., 9 Ohio St. 2d 116, 224 N.E.2d 131 (1967);
Campbell v. Hughes Provision Co., 87 Ohio App. 151, 94 N.E.2d 273 (1949).
B & B Insulation, Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978).
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below which behavior constitutes negligence. Because the
reasonable man personifies the community ideal of reasonable
behavior, evidence of customary conduct of those similarly
situated may be probative in determining his behavior . ..
Custom is, however, not dispositive in negligence actions.
"[W]hat ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.63
At best, the failure of others to wear seat belts is a circumstance to
be considered by the jury. Still, when such conduct creates an extra-
ordinary risk of harm which could be prevented without cost or effort,
the circumstances cannot justify the behavior. Thus, although such a
failure is not negligence per se,16 it is unreasonable conduct and the
jury should be so instructed.265
To so charge the jury requires either that the defendant submit
evidence to support its assertions of efficacy and knowledge or that the
court judicially notice such fact. No decision to date has taken judicial
notice of seat belt efficacy, perhaps because of the belief that seat belts
can cause injury in some circumstances. 6 However, seat belts prevent
and reduce far more injuries than they cause. 6 ' Judicial notice of the
benefits of seat belt use does not require that the court refuse to allow a
jury to weigh the relative merits of use in the specific situation. Such
judicial notice would make possible a more economical use of trial time
by precluding the need to present a maze of scientific literature and ex-
pert testimony to prove a point already well established. In addition, if
notice is not taken and the defendant presents proof of seat belt ef-
ficacy, the adversary would probably spend additional time in rebuttal
presenting the "seat belt syndrome" concepts. The effect would be un-
necessary confusion, overemphasis on the general instead of the specific
aspects of the relevance of seat belt use and potentially inconsistent
decisions.
Id at 1370 (emphasis added).
See note 232 supra.
To prevent a "de facto" or back door absolute contributory negligence
defense, the instruction should specify that the plaintiffs conduct does not
relieve defendant of liability beyond the extent to which defendant, by a
preponderance of the evidence, has established that seat belt use would have
prevented or reduced injuries. See notes 258-59 supra. The jury could, however,
find liability while at the same time finding that no damages are proper under
the circumstances.
' See notes 85-98 supra. Other reasons for such a failure include the possibility
that inadequate data was presented to the court, failure to seek judicial notice by
proper motion and the court's traditional unwillingness to remove "negligence"
issues from the trier of fact.
See notes 64-80 supra and accompanying text.




If the court judicially notices that seat belts generally provide
benefits and then charges the jury that a reasonably prudent person
would wear an available seat belt, the jury function is not invaded. The
court is, in effect, instructing the jury that reasonably prudent conduct
may have reduced the likelihood of harm. The defendant must still sub-
mit competent evidence to establish that the seat belt would have
prevented or reduced the specific injuries sustained in the accident. The
jury alone will determine the ultimate issues of liability and damages.
Certainly the issue of whether a reasonable person would wear an
available seat belt has been a traditional jury question. The continuation
of this approach is not necessary and its abolition would foster decisions
in accord with modern scientific, lay and medical knowledge. When the
traditional jury question is asked, its answer depends solely on what
facts the jury will take into account in regard to seat belt efficacy.
A strong argument can be made that judicial notice of seat belt ef-
ficacy is proper notice of an adjudicative fact under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 69 It is worthy of note that some courts have considered the
definition of adjudicative facts to be something of a non-sequitur and
have resorted to common sense. One opinion dealing with the com-
bustibility of charcoal when doused with a fire starter,27 placed the
facts and judicial notice into such a common sense perspective, declar-
ing: "These are all matters of such common knowledge that the court
feels obliged to take judicial notice of them.... [T]hese facts are so well-
known and not open to challenge as to require that they be judicially
noticed.2 7 1
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not address the propriety of taking
judicial notice of legislative facts." This issue is resolved by the com-
FED. R. EVID. 201.
70 Goodman v. Stalfort Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1976).
21 Id at 894.
27 Relying upon the terminology expressed by Professor Davis in An Ap-
proach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV.
364, 404-07 (1942), and other contributions of Professor Davis, the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to FED. R. EVID. 201 distinguishes adjudicatory from legislative facts:
"Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts ....
are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process,
whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in
the enactment of a legislative body." FED. R. EVID. 201, Advisory Comm. Note.
Whether adjudicative facts serve as the exclusive basis for judicial notice in
federal practice is discussed generally in 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5103 (West 1977). See also, ROTHSTEIN, supra note
151, Practice Commentary at 36. ("Excluded from coverage is judicial notice of
law, 'legislative' facts, and of 'non-evidence' facts.") Distinctions between
legislative and adjudicative facts are also noted in United States v. Gould, 536
F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976); State v. Gorham, 536 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Goodman
v. Stalfort, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 889 (D.N.J. 1976).
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mon law which permits judicial notice of legislative facts." Whether
seat belt efficacy is a "legislative" or an "adjudicatory" fact is actually
an irrelevant exercise in legal sophistry. The answer is the same in both
cases.
Whether pursuant to the federal rule approach or through common
law, a judicially noticed fact must be generally known within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the court or be capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to unquestionable authority."' The common law
approach was clearly expressed in Kennedy v. Parrott.5 "A judge or
court may take judicial notice of any fact in the field of any particular
science which is either so notoriously true as not to be the subject of
reasonable dispute or is capable of demonstration by resort to readily
accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.""7
The fact of seat belt efficacy is well known within any judicial ter-
ritory and is capable of ascertainment through indisputable authority.
The evidence could be noticed through either permissible means, as
both bases for judicial notice are met. It may be argued that if the court
must take judicial notice through the "ascertainment" approach, the
evidence to support the fact is overly complex and comprehensive
thereby precluding the ability required. This argument is invalid. The
court could reach its decision by viewing a single volume authority con-
stituting a compilation of studies.277 Even if this does not constitute the
type of immediate ascertainment desired, another alternative is avail-
able. A formal motion can be brought by the party seeking judicial
notice of seat belt efficacy. This motion could be supported by technical
data in summary form, possibly including a comprehensive bibliography.
" See generally, AM. JUR.2d, Evidence, §§ 14-38 (1967); MCCORMICK, supra
note 137, § 331. The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), made forceful use of legislative facts. Id. at
517-61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The opinion in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), made extensive use of judicial notice of facts
without distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative facts, although many
of the facts noticed might have been classified as "legislative." See also, Jamison
v. Kline, 454 F.2d 1256 (3d Cir. 1972); Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co. v. Dredge,
299 F. Supp. 358, 362 n.4 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
274 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 201(b); ANN. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 451, 452; Garner v. First
National City Bank, 465 F. Supp. 372, 382 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Haye v. United
States, 461 F. Supp. 1168, 1174 (D. Cal. 1978); Chapmun v. Gerard, 341 F. Supp.
1170 (D. Vir. Is.), aff'd, 456 F.2d 577 (1970); United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec-
tric Co., 215 F. Supp. 532 (D. Kan. 1963). Similar holdings are found in state court
decisions. See generally, MCCORMICK, supra note 144, §§ 330-332.
272 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 764 (1956).
276 Id. at 357, 90 S.E.2d at 756 (emphasis added).
277 E.g., SYMPOSIUM, supra note 26; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL





Such a motion could be filed and ruled upon well before trial and, if
granted, would make trial management for the court, parties and jurors
far easier.
As a practical matter, judicial notice of seat belt efficacy will serve to
make judicial and jury decisions more consistent. Utilization of the sug-
gested jury charge will move the decision-making process from the
conduct aspect of plaintiffs behavior, to the effects of such behavior. An
identical approach is used in determining defendants' culpability under
strict tort liability or breach of warranty actions. Evidence of seat belt
efficacy, in general, is supportive of the specific evidence needed to
establish the seat belt defense. It is not collateral to the ultimate issue
or issues. Without the general background presented in the form of
testimony or jury instruction, a jury would be hard pressed to properly
decide the case as it could not fully evaluate the seat belt evidence.
For both legal and practical reasons, a common sense approach to the
seat belt defense suggests that judicial notice be taken of seat belt ef-
ficacy. With this fact noted, a court should determine that no reasonable
juror would find it reasonably prudent not to wear an available seat
belt. If this premise is correct, it becomes appropriate for the court to
decide one aspect of the case as a matter of law, ie., that a reasonably
prudent person would wear an available seat belt.
IX. CONCLUSION
Data from the realms of science, medicine and law all indicate that a
reasonably prudent person should make use of an available restraint
mechanism. Seat belt use will save thousands of lives and prevent tens
of thousands of serious injuries annually. The legislative and judicial
branches of the government should take all possible steps to promote
seat belt use. In this light, mandatory seat belt use legislation and the
application of the seat belt defense make sense.
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Technical Appendix
The physical forces that act on an automobile during a collision se-
quence also determine occupant kinematics. Two frequently occurring
accident patterns - a frontal impact into a barrier and an intersection
collision-may be used to illustrate this point.
A. Frontal Impact
Extensive information about frontal impacts was accumulated in a
Department of Transportation testing program conducted in 1971 and
1972.' The experiments were conducted at an impact speed considerably
higher than that required by the federal government for testing
passenger cars.2 Since the primary design goal for the test vehicles used
in the study was occupant protection, it is reasonable to assume that
greater vehicle deformation and deceleration forces would occur in a
production vehicle.
Experimental safety vehicles (ESV) were built for the study by AMF,
Inc. (AMF) and Fairchild Industries (F)I The AMF and FI vehicles, with
test weights of 6,930 and 6,353 pounds respectively,' performed in a
remarkably similar fashion. The AMF ESV collided with the barrier at
47.7 miles per hour, resulting in a frontal dynamic crush of 2.3 feet, but
causing no passenger compartment intrusion.' The FI ESV impacted the
barrier at 48.9 miles per hour, resulting in a frontal dynamic crush of 2.4
feet, again without passenger compartment intrusion.' The average
deceleration force in the AMF ESV was 34.6 G's, which compared to an
average deceleration force of 32.7 G's in the FI ESV.7 Peak deceleration
forces in the AMF ESV were reached when approximately six inches of
vehicle deformation occurred and were measured at approximately 43
G's.' In the FI ESV a maximum deceleration of approximately 42 G's
was attained at a deformation point of 2.2 feet.9
Fully instrumented, 50th percentile male anthropomorphic dummies
' N. Stahler and F. Arndt, ESV Test Methodology and Results, Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) Paper No. 730590 (1973).
2 An impact speed of 30 miles per hour for frontal barrier impact tests is
specified in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (F.M.V.S.S.) 208, 49 C.F.R. §
571.208 (1979).
8 N. Stahler and F. Arndt, supra note 1 at 1.





' Id. (Figure 7).




were used to measure the injury potential of the collisions." While the
vehicle structures experienced the above-mentioned forces, the ac-
celeration forces on the dummy occupants reached over 50 G's in less
than ten milliseconds in the AMF ESV and over 48 G's within 70 to 80
milliseconds in the FI ESV." Thus, in terms of the effect of vehicle
dynamics on occupant kinematics the major injury-producing potential
began and ended in less than one-tenth of a second.
The dynamics of a high speed barrier impact are overpowering. At a
speed of 60 miles per hour a vehicle is moving at 88 feet per second, yet
when that vehicle impacts against a fixed barrier, it comes to a virtually
instantaneous stop. Vehicle deceleration forces will be on the order of
magnitude of 25 G's. 12 The forces imposed upon front seat unrestrained
occupants will be considerably greater. Assuming the driver's torso is a
typical eleven inches from the steering wheel, he will strike the steering
wheel in less than 2/100ths of a second. The deceleration force involved
is almost 49 G's. 3 The normal passenger will strike the dash and com-
plete dash deformation in 1/100th of a second, and be subjected to a
deceleration force in excess of 100 G's. In either case the vehicle
dynamics create fatal impact forces in less than 2/100ths of a second. 4
B. Intersection Collision
5
Intersection collisions may occur in a variety of fashions. These varia-
tions are the product of a combination of factors such as last-second
driver reaction; tire and road conditions; vehicle strength, weight, and
speed; and the point and angle of impact. For purposes of illustration,
assume a factual situation with the following characteristics: an impact
speed of 30-35 miles per hour; no significant driver reactions; a striking
(bullet) vehicle weight of 5,000 pounds and 3,000 pounds for the struck
(target) vehicle; an angle of impact of 90 degrees; and an impact point on
the left side of the target vehicle's "A" pillar.
In the first milliseconds, the bullet vehicle will sustain a minimal but
immediate deceleration, coupled with front end deformation.
Simultaneously, the target vehicle will sustain more extreme deforma-
tion to its left quarter panel, "A" pillar, door hinges and door areas. In-
Id at 5.
Id at 7 (Figures 9 and 10).
' See British Columbia Road Safety Coordinating Council, Seat Belt Presen-
tation (Feb. 9, 1977) (pamphlet on file with the author), at 4 (Exhibit 4).
13 Id.
14 Id
" The description which follows draws upon the author's experience and
represents a composite of expert testimony given in connection with a significant
number of litigated matters. The testimony was premised upon the laws of
physics, applicable mathematical computations, utilization of computerized recon-
struction programs (SMAC) and the experience of the experts involved.
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stead of decelerating, the target will accelerate due to the force
generated by the impacting bullet vehicle, and change its direction from
straight forward to forward-right.
Within the next 200-500 milliseconds, the potential for injury is at its
highest. If the vehicles separate from each other more rapidly, the peak
potential will be reached in an even shorter time. Once the vehicles
separate the likelihood of injury is lessened and falls off rapidly as the
vehicles move to their respective points of rest. However, injury poten-
tial is present until the final point of rest is reached.
In less than 20 milliseconds, after initial vehicle contact, the target
vehicle will have gained velocity and had its direction modified. In this
illustration, the bullet vehicle generates more force than the target
vehicle because it has a greater mass." The bullet vehicle will move
almost directly forward, deflected slightly to the left due to the
resistance of the struck vehicle. The target vehicle will move almost 90
degrees to the right and the vehicles will begin to line up in parallel
positions. While at some early point during this period the vehicles will
be travelling at identical speeds, the speed of the bullet vehicle will
most likely soon surpass that of the target. This physical fact may be
important if the target vehicle door opens during this phase of the colli-
sion sequence. 7 If the door opens, it will almost instantaneously be con-
tacted by the side of the bullet vehicle. This contact will either close the
door or open it further depending on the precise location of the vehicles
and their relative speeds, but will have little effect on the countinuing
dynamics. The vehicles will come into a parallel mode and continue past
parallel so that the right rear of the bullet vehicle will strike the left
rear of the target vehicle creating a "side-slap." This second vehicle con-
tact (third if there is door contact) will again increase the velocity of the
target vehicle and add a force causing it to revolve. Dependent upon
speeds, tires, damage and other factors, the vehicle may spin 180
degrees and leave the impact point backwards or may spin a full 360
degrees or more. After side-slap, vehicle contact ends and the vehicles
will "roll-out" to their final positions of rest which may be 200 feet or
16 F = Ma; Force = Mass times Acceleration. See R. RESNICK and D. HALLI-
DAY, PHYSICS (1966) at 85. It is the effect represented in this formula (as well as
design differences) that tends to make smaller vehicles less safe in collision cir-
cumstances than larger vehicles. Nevertheless, the Director of the Highway
Research Center, University of North Carolina, has ". . . no doubt . . . that
restraint systems even in small cars, are highly effective in preventing serious in-
jury and death in the event of a crash." Campbell, Seat Belt Effectiveness, 79 IN-
TERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SEAT BELTS 166 (1979). Furthermore, Mr. Campbell
believes that as the number of small vehicles on the road increases the death rate
will rise, unless offset by greater utilization of seat belt restraint systems.
11 If there is a partial ejection at this point a severe blow to the head is possi-
ble. If there is a total ejection the occupant may be crushed between the vehicles.
A window ejection, though less common, is also possible in these circumstances.
[Vol. 29:217
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more from the initial impact point. The roll-out will be completed in a
time-frame of approximately 3-8 seconds, and the entire collision se-
quence from first impact to final resting point will normally occur in
under 8 or 9 seconds. During these vital moments, especially during the
first two seconds or less, the occupant's kinematics are dictated by vehi-
cle dynamics. Injury to an unrestrained occupant is virtually certain.
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